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Policy Facts and Incidents of Ownership Under
Estate Tax Section 2042(2): The Legacy of Rhode
Island Hospital Trust
Richard L. Haight*
I. THE NATURE OF THE ISSUE
A. Introduction
Consider the Federal Estate Tax consequences' to the late Mr.
Smith resulting from the existence of an insurance policy on his
life. Mr. Smith took out the policy several years prior to his death.
The insurance company complied with the contract provisions
when Mr. Smith died, paying the full $500,000 proceeds to the
beneficiaries whom he had named.
Since the proceeds were not payable to Mr. Smith's estate, his
executrix might be tempted to believe that they are not subject to
the Estate Tax as part of the estate. However, the $500,000 must
be included in Mr. Smith's gross estate for Estate Tax purposes if
Mr. Smith possessed at death an "incident of ownership"'2 in the
insurance policy.
It is fairly clear that, in order to determine whether Mr. Smith
had an incident of ownership in the policy, the provisions of the
insurance contract (sometimes called the "policy terms") should be
examined. However, since 1966, when United States v. Rhode Is-
* The author has a B.A. from Boston University, a J.D. from Suffolk University, and
an LL.M. in Taxation from Boston University. Formerly employed as a Tax Attorney for
the Office of Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service and as an Attorney-Advisor for
the United States Tax Court, the author is currently a Professor of Law at Ohio Northern
University.
1. The provisions of the Federal Estate Tax are found in Subtitle B of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references in this article will
be to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
2. The quoted term appears in Section 2042(2) in the Estate Tax portion of the
Internal Revenue Code. See infra note 9. For the purposes of this article, it is assumed that
the proceeds of the insurance policy are not payable to the decedent's estate (i.e., to the
decedent's "executor"), a fact which would warrant includability in the gross estate under
Section 2042(1). See infra n.8.
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land Hosp. Trust Co.3 (hereinafter RIHT)4 was decided by the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, there has been some confu-
sion in the decided cases as to whether, and to what extent, factors
beyond the policy terms are pertinent to this inquiry. Some cases
have treated RIHT as authority for viewing the policy terms alone
as determinative; other cases have not regarded RIHT as requiring
so narrow a focus and have considered the impact of various fac-
tors outside of the insurance contract provisions; and still other
cases have ignored RIHT completely.
As a consequence, Mr. Smith's executrix will find that the ques-
tion of whether the decedent had an incident of ownership in the
$500,000 policy is not necessarily one which lends itself to easy
resolution.
The purpose of this article is to examine the current state of the
law in this area5 and to suggest a rational approach for dealing
with this issue in the future.
B. Incidents of Ownership
It is difficult to comprehend the full import of the RIHT case
without having a basic understanding of what the concept of inci-
dents of ownership entails.
The incidents of ownership test, first applied in a life insurance
context by the Supreme Court in 1929,6 was formally made a part
of the Estate Tax statute in 1942.1 Under Section 2042(2), in the
current version of the Internal Revenue Code, life insurance pro-
ceeds (paid to someone other than the decedent's personal repre-
sentative) s are included in the insured's gross estate if they are
3. 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966).
4. For ease of discussion, the 1966 Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. case is referred to
in this article as "RIHT."
5. Previously, this subject received consideration in K. Eliasberg: IRC Section 2042
- The Estate Taxation of Life Insurance: What Is an Incident of Ownership?, 51 TAXES
91 (1973), and in W. Thies, What Is Effect of Insurance Policy Facts When Intent of Par-
ties Differs From Them?, 29 J. OF TAX'N 269 (1968).
6. Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 335 (1929).
7. Revenue Act of 1942, Chapter 619, Section 404, 56 Stat. 798 (1942). The earlier
versions of the life insurance provision of the Estate Tax statute gave weight to premium
payments in deciding the includability question. See, e.g., Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S.
264, 268-269 (1938).
8. Under Section 2042(1) of the current Internal Revenue Code, insurance proceeds
which are "receivable by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the dece-
dent" are included in the decedent's gross estate without regard to an incidents of owner-
ship test. Section 2042(2) applies when the proceeds under a policy on the decedent's life
are not "receivable" by the decedent's personal representative.
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payable under a policy "with respect to which the decedent [in-
sured] possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership,
exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person.' '
The purpose of the test is to prevent avoidance of the application
of the Estate Tax by an insured who has made an inter vivos dis-
position of a life insurance policy, but nonetheless has retained un-
til death some of the benefits of ownership in the policy.' 0
Aside from one example appearing in Section 2042(2), itself,1"
the Code does not define the term "incident of ownership." Exam-
ples of incidents of ownership were described in the relevant com-
mittee reports 2 and now appear in the regulations:
13
9. Emphasis added. The pertinent provision in current Section 2042, as enacted in
1954, reads as follows:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property -
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARIES.-To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries [than the executor] as insurance under policies on
the life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any
of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either along or in conjunction with any
other person. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term "incidents of owner-
ship" includes a reversionary interest ....
10. Estate of Rockwell v. Comm'r, 779 F.2d 931, 933 (3rd Cir. 1985); Estate of Con-
nelly v. United States, 551 F.2d 545, 551 (3rd Cir. 1977).
11. Section 2042(2) describes a reversionary interest in the policy as an incident of
ownership. See in this regard Section 20.2042-1(c)(3), Estate Tax Regs., and Rev. Rul. 117,
1979-1 C.B. 305.
12. S. Rept. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1942), 1942-2 CB 504, 677; H. Rept. 2333,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1942), 1942-2 C.B. 372, 491.
13. Section 20.2042-1(c)(2), Estate Tax Regs. The following sentence used to follow
the paragraph quoted in the text: "Similarly, the term includes the power to change the
beneficiary reserved to a corporation of which the decedent is the sole stockholder." Amend-
ments were made to the regulations under Section 2042 (see T.D. 7312, April 26, 1974, and
TD 7623, May 14, 1979). The sentence following the paragraph quoted in the text now reads
as follows: "See subparagraph (6) of this paragraph for rules relating to the circumstances
under which the incidents of ownership held by a corporation are attributable to a decedent
through his stock ownership." Section 20.2042-1(c)(6), Estate Tax Regs., which now pro-
vides the corporate attribution rules, reads, in part, as follows:
[11f the decedent is the controlling stockholder in a corporation, and the corporation
owns a life insurance policy on his life, the proceeds of which are payable to the
decedent's spouse, the incidents of ownership held by the corporation will be attrib-
uted to the decedent through his stock ownership, and the proceeds will be included
in his gross estate under section 2042. . . . For purposes of this subparagraph, the
decedent will not be deemed to be the controlling stockholder of a corporation unless,
at the time of his death, he owned stock possessing more than 50 percent of the total
combined voting power of the corporation.
This provision of the regulations also states that there will be no attribution to a decedent/
shareholder of incidents in a corporation-owned policy "to the extent the proceeds of the
policy are payable to the corporation." This exception reflects the wide use of life insurance
in funding corporate buy-sell arrangements.
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[T]he term "incidents of ownership" is not limited in its meaning to owner-
ship of the policy in the technical legal sense. Generally speaking, the term
has reference to the right of the insured or his estate to the economic bene-
fits of the policy. Thus it includes the power to change the beneficiary, to
surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment,
to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against
the surrender value of the policy, etc.
The listing of incidents in Section 2042(2) and in the accompa-
nying regulations14 does not purport to be exhaustive. 15 Moreover,
the court decisions dealing with this topic have acknowledged that
"it is not possible to draw a clear line with respect to this issue." It
has been pointed out more than once that "[t]he very phrase 'inci-
dents of ownership' connotes something partial, minor, or even
fractional in scope. 1 7 As a result, "it is not the number of powers
possessed that is the determining factor. Rather it is the existence
of even a 'fractional' power not the 'probability' of its exercise that
controls."' 8
Given the broad parameters of this statutory term, courts have
viewed limited, insubstantial, or nominal rights as constituting in-
cidents of ownership. For example, it has been held that a dece-
dent's mere right to consent to (or veto) the exercise of a power
held by another is an incident of ownership because there is no
significant difference under Section 2042(2) between the power to
make changes and the power to bar changes. 9 On the other hand,
it has been held that an incident of ownership does not exist when
a decedent has a mere expectancy in policy proceeds,2" or when
14. See paragraphs (1) through (6) of Section 20.2042-1(c), Estate Tax Regs., for the
complete regulatory discussion of the term. Some additional aspects of these provisions will
be dealt with below.
15. Estate of Smead v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 413, 47-48 (1982). In Smead, the court stated
that the failure of the committee reports or the regulations to list a particular right or power
as an example of an incident of ownership "is not determinative." 78 T.C. at 48.
16. Schwager v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 781, 790 (1975).
17. RIHT, 355 F.2d at 10. These sentences have often been quoted in subsequent
opinions.
18. Schwager, 64 T.C. at 791. Rev. Rul. 129, 1979-1 C.B. 206, presents an interesting
example of a "fractional" power. In that ruling, the decedent had the right to obtain a loan
against the surrender value of the policy on his life, such right being limited to the amount
of the premiums that had been paid. This right was held by the Internal Revenue Service to
be an incident of ownership, sufficient to warrant the inclusion in the decedent's gross estate
of the entire policy proceeds.
19. Schwager, 64 T.C. at 791. The Court stated that "it is the power and not the
substantiality of the power that we must look to." Id.
20. Estate of Margrave v. Comm'r, 618 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1980). In that case, the dece-
dent's ability to designate the beneficiary of a trust to which the proceeds of the policy were
payable, was held to be a mere power over an expectancy in view of the powers held by the
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any action by a decedent to affect a policy would constitute an ac-
tionable breach of contract.21
Incidents of ownership are frequently described as rights to a life
insurance policy's "economic benefits." This feature is emphasized
in the regulations under Section 2042(2), which provide that "the
term has reference to the right of the insured or his estate to the
economic benefits from the policy.
'22
From this language it would appear that there are two underly-
ing requirements which must be satisfied if a right in an insurance
policy is to constitute an incident of ownership: First, the right
must relate to an economic benefit; second, the economic benefit
must inure to the decedent or to the decedent's estate.23
However, as to this second regulatory requirement, the Internal
Revenue Service has taken the position that it is not necessary
under Section 2042(2) for the decedent to benefit personally as
long as the decedent has control over who does benefit. Often, but
not always,24 the IRS will support this seemingly contradictory po-
sition by citing a companion regulatory provision which concludes
that a decedent has an incident in a policy held in trust if the de-
decedent's spouse over the policy, and the court concluded that includability under Section
2042(2) was therefore not warranted. The court of appeals affirmed the Tax Court on this
issue, 71 T.C. 13 (1979). The Tax Court opinion is discussed in K. Eliasberg, Estate of
Robert B. Margrave and the Estate Taxation of Life Insurance-Incidents of Ownership
Revisited, INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL (#679, August 1979) at 443.
21. See Estate of Bartlett v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 1590, 1597-98 (1970), wherein the court
held that a mere "ability" to affect a life insurance policy, without the legal "right" to do so,
was not an incident of ownership. Thus, in Bartlett, the decedent's ability to cash in an
insurance policy on his life was not considered an incident of ownership when such an action
would have been in breach of the decedent's trust agreement and a fraud upon the trustee.
The Bartlett case is discussed below in connection with Example 3.1.
22. Section 20.2042-1(c)(2), Estate Tax Regs. Note that this sentence is introduced
with the phrase, "generally speaking," and one must wonder whether it is the position of the
Treasury that it may be possible to have an incident of ownership in a policy if the right or
power possessed by the decedent does not bear a relationship to any economic benefit flow-
ing from the policy. The weight of the cases is against such a proposition. See note 26, infra.
23. The emphasis given by the regulations to economic benefit seems to go beyond
the congressional mandate, as that mandate is disclosed by the committee reports. Estate of
Connelly v. United States, 551 F.2d 545, 547 n.7 (3rd Cir. 1977).
24. See Rev. Rul. 70, 1975-1 C.B. 301. In Morton v. United States, discussed below in
connection with Example 1.1, the Government argued that, if the decedent by virtue of his
retained rights in a policy on his life, could effect the transfer of the policy proceeds, he had
an incident of ownership even though there was no possibility of personal economic benefit.
Because the court concluded that the decedent had assigned all of his rights in the policy,
the court stated that it was unnecessary to decide "whether retention by him of incidental
powers which could not possibly occasion him economic benefit might be sufficient 'inci-
dents of ownership' to bring the proceeds of the policy within Section 2042(2)." 457 F.2d at
753, n.4.
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cedent "has the power (as trustee or otherwise) to change the ben-
eficial ownership in the policy or its proceeds, or the time or man-
ner of enjoyment thereof, even though the decedent has no
beneficial interest in the trust."25 The courts have taken varying
positions as to whether this language eliminates any requirement
for the decedent (or the decedent's estate) to have a direct, per-
sonal benefit from the policy.2 '
In this article, it is assumed in most instances that, if the power
under discussion was actually held by a decedent at death, it was
an incident of ownership under Section 2042(2). While not all of
the referenced court opinions are careful in defining the question
before them, the focus in the article is primarily on whether an
acknowledged incident of ownership is in fact possessed by a dece-
dent. Under Section 2042(2), do we resolve this question by look-
ing just to the policy terms, or are other factors relevant in making
this determination?
C. The Leading Cases
1. Rhode Island Hospital Trust
In RIHT, the father of D27 had purchased an insurance policy on
the life of D when D was 18. The proceeds were payable to D's
25. Section 20.2042-1(c)(4), Estate Tax Regs. Cf. n.106, infra.
26. While a thorough analysis of these cases is beyond the scope of this article, the
reader's attention is directed to the discussion of this point and the authorities cited in
Estate of Connelly v. United States, 551 F.2d at 547, 551-552, and Estate of Rockwell v.
Comm'r, 779 F.2d 931, 934-935 (3rd Cir. 1985). See also RIHT, 355 F.2d at 11. In Rockwell,
several insurance policies on the decedent's life were held in an irrevocable trust. The dece-
dent was not the trustee, but he had the power to veto any assignment of the policies by the
trustee if the assignee did not have an insurable interest in the decedent's life. The court
held that the decedent was unable to exercise his limited retained power for his own eco-
nomic benefit and that he, therefore, did not have any incident of ownership in the policies.
In so holding, the court stated (779 F.2d at 937): "Congress' purpose in requiring the inclu-
sion of policies in a gross estate when the decedent retains incidents of ownership is to
prevent taxpayers from enjoying property without paying tax on it. Rockwell [decedent], by
his retained power neither enjoyed the benefits nor exerted ownership of life insurance poli-
cies." Compare the result in Rockwell with the result in Revenue Ruling 75-70. In Estate of
Bloch v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 850, 862-864 (1982), the decedent pledged a policy insuring his life
as collateral for a personal loan. The policy was part of the corpus of a trust of which the
decedent was the trustee. The decedent's use of the policy for his personal economic benefit
was viewed by the court as an actionable breach of his fiduciary duty. Thus, despite the
economic benefit inuring to the decedent, the court held that he possessed no incidents of
ownership in the policy under Section 2042(2).
27. In this article, the letter D (for "decedent") will be used to refer to the person on
whose life there is a policy of insurance (the "insured") and who, at death, arguably pos-
sessed an incident of ownership in that policy, resulting in the inclusion of the policy pro-
ceeds in his or her gross estate under Estate Tax Section 2042(2).
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father and mother. The father kept the policy in his safe deposit
box and paid all of the premiums.
It was clearly understood by D and his father that the father was
the effective owner of the policy and that D would never benefit
from it. Nevertheless, under the contract of insurance, D was
granted various powers, including the rights to change benefi-
ciaries, to assign the policy, and to borrow on the policy.
28
Pursuant to his understanding with his father, D never exercised
any of these powers, at least for his own benefit. When his mother
died, his father told him to change the beneficiary designation to
make the father the primary beneficiary, and D complied. D did
not otherwise exercise any of the powers granted to him by the
policy. At D's death, the proceeds of the insurance policy were paid
to the father.
In its opinion, the court acknowledged that the father was the
instigator, premium payer, and primary beneficiary of the policy
and, pursuant to his understanding with D, had full control over
the policy. Notwithstanding these facts, the court held that the
proceeds of the policy were includable in D's gross estate under
Section 2042(2).
In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed out that the case
presented two kinds of facts-"intent facts" and "policy facts."
The "intent facts" were those facts which related to the conduct
and understanding of D and his father, showing that the father
was regarded as the owner of the policy. The "policy facts" were
those facts revealed by the insurance contract, showing that D had
various substantive rights and powers.2"
The court held that the intent facts were not relevant and that,
in view of the policy facts, the case fell squarely within the ambit
of Section 2042(2). The Court pointed out that when Congress
added the "incidents of ownership" language in 1942, Congress in-
tended the term to cover the mere existence of a power in an insur-
ance policy. Congress believed includability was warranted even
where a decedent's interest in a policy was "partial, minor, or even
28. See RIHT, 355 F.2d at 9, wherein the court listed various "rights, privileges, or
powers accorded to the decedent." The Court also pointed out that D had an additional
negative power in view of the fact that D's signature was necessary if the father wanted to
change the beneficiaries, to surrender the policy for its cash value, or to do other things with
reference to the policy. The Court felt that even such a negative power in D would be "inci-
dent of ownership," it being irrelevant under the express provisions of Section 2042(2) that
it was exercisable "in conjunction with [another] person." Id. at 11.
29. Id. at 8. For a list of D's rights and powers under the insurance contract, see Id.
1989
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fractional in its scope. '"30
It was not essential for D to have had control over the economic
benefits, according to the court; all that was necessary for in-
cludability was that D be able to "affect the transfer of policy pro-
ceeds. '31 Here, D could do so even, in some instances, without hav-
ing actual possession of the policy.
32
The court concluded it was irrelevant that an understanding ex-
isted between D and his father that D would not exercise any of
the powers granted to D under the policy. The critical question for
includability under Section 2042(2) was what rights and powers
did D actually possess under the policy facts.
2. Estate of Noel
In RIHT, the Court of Appeals placed heavy reliance on a then
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Commissioner
v. Estate of Noel.3 3 In Noel, D, about to board an airplane, applied
for two policies of insurance on his life. D's spouse (S), who accom-
panied D to the airport, paid for the policies. D told the clerk that
the policies were S's, and the clerk gave the documentation to S. A
few hours later, D was killed when the plane on which he was trav-
eling crashed.
Among other things, the contracts of insurance gave D the right
to change the beneficiaries and to assign the policies. The taxpayer
argued before the Supreme Court that D did not have any inci-
dents of ownership in the policies. Three alternative reasons were
given:
(a) S purchased the policies, and, as owner, S possessed all inci-
dents of ownership.
(b) Assuming that D owned the policies, D gave the policies to S,
and D could therefore not exercise the powers granted to him by
the policy terms.
(c) Assuming that D retained the powers granted to D by the pol-
icy terms, D was unable to exercise them while D was on the air-
plane-up to the moment of death.
The Supreme Court held that the proceeds of the policies were
includable in D's gross estate under Section 2042(2). The Court
30. Id. at 10.
31. Id. at 11.
32. Id.
33. Comm'r v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
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responded to the taxpayer's arguments as follows:
As to arguments (a) and (b): Regardless of whether S purchased
the policies or was given the policies by D, the policy terms gave D,
and not S, the power to assign the policies and to change the bene-
ficiaries. These terms rebutted the claims that S became the com-
plete owner of the policy and that S's ownership precluded the ex-
istence of any rights in D. D held the powers granted to D under
the insurance contracts up to the moment of death. 4
As to argument (c): While it is true that, as a practical matter, D
could not exercise his retained powers once D had boarded the air-
plane and that, therefore, the powers were not exercisable by D at
the moment of death, Congress did not intend to have Estate Tax
liability determined "by an individual's fluctuating, day-by-day,
hour-by-hour capacity to dispose of property which he owns."''
The term "incidents of ownership" means "a general, legal power
to exercise ownership, without regard to the owner's ability to ex-
ercise it at a particular moment. '3 6
In RIHT, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on Noel to support
its conclusion that policy facts are determinative on the question
of includability under Section 2042(2)-even in situations where a
person other than the decedent can be viewed as owning the pol-
icy. The Court of Appeals also gave considerable weight to the con-
clusion in Noel that it is of no importance that a decedent might
not be able, as a practical matter, to exercise at death the powers
granted by the insurance contract. In this respect, the Court of Ap-
peals apparently believed the decedent in Noel and the decedent
in RIHT were similarly situated - D in Noel could not exercise
the powers because D was in an airplane at the moment of death;
D in RIHT could not exercise the powers because of the under-
standing that D's father was the owner of the policy.
While Noel does provide support for the RIHT conclusion that
policy facts predominate heavily in this area of the law, nothing in
Noel provides direct support for the proposition, articulated in
34. Noel, 380 U.S. at 683. The Supreme Court also pointed out:
Nothing we have said is to be taken as meaning that a policyholder is without power
to divest himself of all incidents of ownership over his insurance policies by a proper
gift or assignment, so as to bar its inclusion in his gross estate under Sec. 2042(2).
What we do hold is that no such transfer was made of the policies here involved.
Id. at 684.
35. Id. Note also that Section 2042(2) refers to incidents of ownership "which the




RIHT, that the so-called intent facts are basically not relevant on
the issue of includability under Section 2042(2) .
7
D. Examining the Post-RIHT Cases
This article analyzes Section 2042(2) cases decided subsequent
to RIHT to study the extent to which RIHT has affected the pro-
cess of ascertaining the existence of incidents of ownership. Since
its issuance in 1966, RIHT has been widely cited in cases in which
the terms of the insurance contract have conflicted with other
facts, thereby creating an issue as to whether the decedent pos-
sessed the requisite incidents of ownership under Section 2042(2).
While some courts have resolved this issue without reference to
RIHT, others have placed heavy reliance on the case and, in some
instances, have rigidly applied the predominance of the policy facts
principle. In this latter group are cases which seem to have
adopted the view that this RIHT principle is to be applied virtu-
ally without regard to other elements present in the case. These
cases can arguably stand for the proposition that, under RIHT, the
policy facts are solely determinative of the question of whether the
decedent possessed incidents of ownership." Most cases, however,
have placed limitations on application of the RIHT principle.
A review of the post-RIHT cases in this area suggests that most
of the courts have based their decisions on an analysis of two
groups of factors. For convenience of discussion, these factors are
referred to in this article as the "policy factors" and the "outside
factors," defined as follows: Policy Factors: The provisions of the
life insurance policy, i.e., the terms of the contract of insurance, as
they appear in the application for insurance and in the policy doc-
ument, including endorsements thereto, as well as in any written
amendments and assignments of the policy which are filed with
and accepted by the insurance company. Outside Factors: Matters
which bear some relationship to the insurance policy, but which
are not apparent from an examination of the language of the insur-
ance contract, i.e., matters pertaining to the insurance policy which
are extrinsic to the policy factors.
37. The court in RIHT stated that there was at least one occasion when intent facts
could have relevance. RIHT, 355 F.2d at 13. See the General Comments, below, for Exam-
ples 5.1 and 5.2.
38. See, e.g., Puchner v. United States, discussed below in connection with Example
3.1. See also Kearns v. United States, and Nance v. United States, discussed in connection




It is clear from the vast majority of the post-RIHT cases that
policy factors alone are not always determinative on the question
of whether a decedent had an incident of ownership in a life insur-
ance policy and that a consideration of certain outside factors is at
times essential to a resolution of the issue of includability under
Section 2042(2).
There are two general categories of post-RIHT cases which pre-
sent the policy factors vs. outside factors issue. They are referred
to in this article as "term deletion cases" and "term addition
cases," defined as follows: Term Deletion Cases: Cases in which
the taxpayer takes the position that outside factors have the effect
of deleting terms from the insurance contract, i.e., cases in which
the taxpayer contends that, although the policy factors indicate
that the decedent had an incident of ownership in the insurance
policy, the outside factors establish that the decedent did not have
such a right or power. Term Addition Cases: Cases in which the
Internal Revenue Service takes the position that outside factors
have the effect of adding terms to the insurance contract, i.e., cases
in which the IRS contends that, although the policy factors indi-
cate that the decedent did not have an incident of ownership in
the insurance policy, the outside factors establish that the dece-
dent did have such a right or power.
E. Outside Factors in General
As will be seen from the discussion of the cases in this article,
there is no certainty in any given case that a court is going to find
that a particular outside factor is relevant in determining whether
a decedent had incidents of ownership in an insurance policy.
However, certain outside factors have been dealt with by the
courts, and they merit particular attention.
One of the more important outside factors to be examined in a
Section 2042(2) case is the applicable local law. The manner in
which state law construes the terms of a life insurance policy, or
otherwise bears upon the rights granted by the policy, is frequently
pertinent to the determination of whether a decedent held an inci-
dent of ownership. It is possible in a given case for the state law to
contradict what appears to be the plain language of the insurance
contract. Those Section 2042(2) cases which address the effect of
local law, present the following question:
QUESTION: Is there a local case or statutory provision which, when ap-
plied to the terms of the insurance policy, would regard the decedent as
possessing (or, alternatively, not possessing) a particular right or power?
1989
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In this regard, it is also possible for a Section 2042(2) case to
present the following question:
QUESTION: Is there a court order bearing on the insurance policy which
effectively grants an incident of ownership to the decedent (or, alterna-
tively, takes an incident of ownership away from the decedent)?
Another outside factor relates to the existence of formal and in-
formal arrangements between the decedent and a third party and
to the effect that these agreements or understandings have under
local law. Those Section 2042(2) cases which address the effect of
such "side" arrangements, usually present one of the following
questions:
QUESTION: Has the decedent formally assigned an incident of ownership
to a third party (or, alternatively, has a third party formally assigned an
incident of ownership to the decedent)?
QUESTION: Have the decedent and a third party made some informal ar-
rangement whereby a particular right or power granted by the policy to the
decedent is exercisable only by the third party (or, alternatively, have they
made an informal arrangement whereby a particular right or power granted
by the policy to the third party is exercisable by the decedent)?
The question of subjective intent may be relevant in resolving
some of these questions, particularly the last question above, and
intent is therefore another outside factor which can have a bearing
on iDcidents of ownership. 9 Intent is also a pertinent consideration
in those Section 2042(2) cases which present the following
question:
QUESTION: Is a particular incident of ownership granted to the decedent
merely because of an error made by the insurance company, i.e., is the exis-
tence of that right or power in the policy clearly contrary to an understand-
ing reached by the decedent and the insurance company? (In the alterna-
tive, is a particular incident of ownership not granted to the decedent
merely because of an error made by the insurance company, i.e., is the exis-
tence of such a right or power in the policy clearly consistent with an under-
standing reached by the decedent and the insurance company?)
An examination of cases presenting these questions follows in
Part II.
39. As a consequence, the following additional question may become relevant, not-
withstanding the RIHT rule: Is a particular incident of ownership which is granted by the
policy terms to the decedent consistent with (or, alternatively, contrary to) the.decedent's
subjective intent?
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II. OUTSIDE FACTORS UNDER THE POST-RIHT CASES
A. Introduction
The following is a discussion of significant post-RIHT cases in
which it was argued by either the taxpayer or the Government
that, in determining whether the decedent had incidents of owner-
ship under Section 2042(2), the outside factors should predominate
over the policy factors.
For ease of analysis, the cases are divided into five broad catego-
ries, determined by reference to the nature of the outside factors
under consideration. These outside factors are (1) local law, (2)
court orders, (3) formal "side" arrangements, (4) informal "side"
arrangements, and (5) insurance company errors.
The discussion of each of these five outside factors is preceded
by two simple examples showing the nature of the issue presented
by the subsequent cases in both the term deletion and term addi-
tion contexts. In each of the examples, it is to be assumed that (1)
when the decedent died, an insurance company paid out proceeds
on a policy insuring the life of the decedent,40 and (2) the Internal
Revenue Service has taken the position that the proceeds of that
policy are includable in the decedent's gross estate under Section
2042(2) .41
B. The Effect of Local Law
1. Examples
EXAMPLE 1.1.: TERM DELETION CASE
Policy Factors: The policy terms state that, at death, D had the right to
change the beneficiaries on the policy. Outside Factors: Under the statutory
or case law of the state, D did not have that right at death.
EXAMPLE 1.2: TERM ADDITION CASE
Policy Factors: The policy terms do not give D the right to change the ben-
eficiaries on the policy. Outside Factors: Under the statutory or case law of
the state, D did have that right at death.
The examples present the question of whether the relevant pro-
40. It is important under Section 2042(2) that the decedent be the person whose life
is insured under the policy at issue. If the decedent owns at death a policy insuring the life
of another person, Section 2042(2) does not apply to that policy. Includability of the value
of the policy in the gross estate in that circumstance comes under the purview of another
Estate tax provision, e.g., Section 2033. See Section 20.2042-1(a)(2), Estate Tax Regs.
41. In the examples and the cases, the letter "D" is used to refer to the insured dece-
dent (see n.27, supra), the letter "S" is used to refer to the decedent's spouse, and the
Letter "X" is used to refer to an unrelated third party.
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visions of State law can be more important than the terms of the
insurance policy. This question can be broken down into two parts:
If the policy terms grant the decedent an incident of ownership,
but local law eliminates or nullifies that right or power, does Sec-
tion 2042(2) apply? If the policy terms do not grant the decedent
an incident of ownership but local law does grant the decedent an
incident, does Section 2042(2) apply?
2. Term Deletion Cases
In Morton v. United States,42 D applied for and was issued a life
insurance policy on D's life. D never considered himself the owner
of the policy intending it to provide financial security for D's
spouse (S). D never paid any of the premiums. (They were paid by
others, including S.) Under the terms of the policy, D, as the in-
sured, had various incidents of ownership. D executed an endorse-
ment in which he made an irrevocable designation of the benefi-
ciaries" and the mode of settlement. This action left D with
certain incidents of ownership under the policy terms. The policy
factors showed that D still had (1) the right to assign. (2) the right
to surrender for cash surrender value, and (3) the right to obtain
loans.
The court examined the outside factors and held that, regardless
of the policy factors, D did not have an incident of ownership in
the policy. The court looked to state law which provided that D's
irrevocable designation of S as the policy beneficiary made S a
third party beneficiary to a contract with enforceable rights. In this
respect, the court regarded the case as distinguishable from RIHT.
Given the local law provisions, the court concluded that it was im-
possible for D to exercise the retained incidents of ownership in
any manner that would control the disposition of the proceeds or
in any other way produce an economic benefit to D or D's estate.
The court stated: "We hold that where an insured has never paid a
premium and has never for any purpose treated the property as his
own that his irrevocable designation of beneficiaries and mode of
payment of proceeds is an effective assignment of all of his inci-
dents of ownership in the policy."""
42. 457 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1972), afJ'g. 322 F. Supp. 1139 (S.D. W. Va. 1971).
43. The primary beneficiaries under the endorsement were D's spouse and children.
Id. at 752, n.2.
44. Id. at 755. Presumedly, the quoted conclusion by the court is based on the law of
the state (West Virginia) involved in the case. However, the opinion may suggest to some
readers that the court is adopting a rule of general application in Section 2042(2) cases.
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The Internal Revenue Service also argued that even if D had no
independent power, he still had the power under the policy terms
to act "in conjunction with"45 the beneficiaries 46 in exercising inci-
dents of ownership. The court held that, given the fact that S had
paid premiums and was irrevocably designated as beneficiary,
under the applicable State law the incidents of ownership were ex-
ercisable by S alone.47 The court stated:
It is not necessary to ignore the policy facts in order to recognize that with
respect to premium derived options it is clear that the decedent never con-
sidered the policy his, and had the question come up, that all parties would
have doubtless agreed that the decedent's wife should be entitled to exercise
these options.48
In sum, the court held that even though D was granted incidents
of ownership by the policy factors, D would not be regarded as
possessing any incident of ownership in the policy when the
outside factors show that under local law D did not have the
power49 to exercise those incidents.
Estate of Carlstrom v. Commissioner" shows another applica-
tion of this principle in a term deletion setting. In that case, D was
the president of (and ultimately controlled) a family corporation
which had committed to pay the premiums on an insurance policy
on D's life. D's spouse (S) applied for the policy and signed the
application as the purchaser. D signed the application as the in-
sured. Shortly after the policy was issued, the insurance company
45. Section 2042(2) includes proceeds in a decedent's gross estate if the decedent pos-
sesses "incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other
person."
46. The court regarded the decedent's spouse as the assignee of the incidents of own-
ership under state law. Morton, 457 F.2d at 754.
47. The court held that, under state law, when an individual who has paid policy
premiums is irrevocably designated as the beneficiary under the policy, that individual "has
the legal power to exercise the options in the insurance contract which pertain to the use of
these premiums without participation of the insured." The court further stated: "We think
that general principles of equity and contract law strongly suggest that exercise of such
premium payment derived rights properly belong[s] to the irrevocably designated benefi-
ciary who has paid the premiums to the exclusion of the insured who contributed nothing."
Id.
48. Id. at 754-755. The question might be asked here whether the court is adopting
some sort of theory by which, contrary to the RIHT principle, "intent facts" can override
"policy facts."
49. The court stated that "the decisive factor is the existence of the power to exercise
incidents of ownership either alone or in conjunction with any other person." Id. at 754
[Emphasis supplied by the court]. Note that some courts address the issue of whether D
"possessed" an incident of ownership by asking whether D had the power to exercise the
incident.
50. 76 T.C. 142 (1981).
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was sent a document requesting that the policy be amended. The
document sought (1) to have the corporation named as the owner
of the policy, but without the right to change the beneficiary, and
(2) to designate irrevocably the corporation and S as the benefi-
ciaries under the policy. The document was executed by D in his
capacity as the insured and as corporate president. It was not
signed by S, who was not even aware of its existence.
Both D and the insurance company apparently believed that the
policy, as originally issued, gave D the power to amend the policy.
When D died three years later, the insurance company treated the
amendment as part of the policy terms and paid the proceeds to
the corporation and to S.
The policy factors in Carlstrom are shown in the terms of the
original insurance contract as modified by the amendment. Relying
on these policy factors, the Internal Revenue Service wanted to in-
clude the proceeds in D's gross estate under Section 2042(2). The
position of the IRS was that the policy factors showed that the
corporation was the owner and, since D owned over 70% of the
corporate stock at death, the corporation's incidents of ownership
should be attributed to D."
The Tax Court disagreed that the corporation had incidents of
ownership in the policy. The court based its decision on the
outside factors, specifically the provisions of State law bearing on
amendments to insurance policies. The court pointed out that S
was the owner of the policy under local law and that only S could
have made a proper amendment. Accordingly, the amendment
made by D was not valid52 As a result, at D's death, the corpora-
51. The attribution of corporate incidents of ownership to controlling or sole share-
holders is covered in Section 20.2042-1(c)(6), Estate Tax Regs. See n. 13, supra, and the
accompanying text. Note that the regulations provide that "the corporation's incidents of
ownership will not be attributed to the decedent through this stock ownership to the extent
the proceeds of the policy are payable to the corporation . . . [or to] a third party for a valid
business purpose .... " In Carlstrom, the IRS sought to include in D's gross estate only the
portion of the proceeds paid to W. See also Rev. Rul. 145, 1982-1 C.B. 213.
Technically, perhaps, a decedent's stock holdings in a corporation can be viewed as an
outside factor. However, for purposes of this article, a decedent who can control the deci-
sions of a corporation is regarded as possessing the incidents of ownership held by the cor-
poration under the policy factors. The practical situation of such a decedent is generally not
significantly distinguishable from that of a decedent who possesses the incidents directly;
absent evidence to the contrary, the imposition of the corporate entity in this context is a
minimal inhibition of the decedent's ability to exercise the relevant powers. Moreover, it is
possible to argue that includability is warranted under Section 2042(2) because the decedent
is able to exercise the incidents of ownership "in conjunction with" the corporation. See
Cockrill v. O'Hara, 302 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
52. In Bintliff v. United States, 462 F.2d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1972), although D's spouse
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tion held no incidents of ownership which could be attributed to D.
All such incidents were held by S, therefore the proceeds were not
includable in D's gross estate under Section 2042(2)."
The Tax Court in Carlstrom did not regard the policy factors in
that case as determinative. However, since the Carlstrom opinion
makes no mention of the RIHT case, the court was not compelled
to point out any distinguishing elements.
3. Term Addition Cases
In Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner,54 the Tax Court again
made no reference to RIHT in reaching the conclusion that outside
factors were to control over policy factors. In Meyer, a term addi-
tion case, the application for the policy on D's life designated D's
spouse (S) as the owner of the policy, and S signed the application
as purchaser. The policy designated S as the owner. Thus, the pol-
icy factors indicated that D had no incidents of ownership in the
policy. Nevertheless, the IRS argued and the court agreed that one
half of the proceeds was includable in D's gross estate under Sec-
tion 2042(2).
The court relied on the provisions of the local community prop-
erty law55 (outside factors) in holding that, notwithstanding the
language on the application (policy factors), D held a one-half
community interest in the policy and its proceeds.
Meyer is a term addition case because the court's opinion gives
D a 50% ownership interest which the policy terms, standing
alone, do not appear to grant to D. The language of the insurance
contract has been affected by the application of state law. 6
(S) held all incidents of ownership, D was required by a bank to co-sign the assignment of
the insurance policy as security for a loan to D and S. The court pointed out that D's co-
signing was superfluous and did not operate to grant D an incident of ownership. Cf. Estate
of Goodwyn v. Comm'r, par. 73, 153 T.C.M. (P-H) (1973) at 736-737.
53. It is interesting to observe that the insurance company in Carlstrom dealt with
the amendment as though it were valid and made the distribution of proceeds in accordance
with its requirements. 76 T.C. at 145. The Tax Court's determination of the realities for tax
purposes (that the amendment was invalid) is clearly at odds with what actually occurred.
Generally, courts try to avoid this type of result; see, on a related point, the discussion in
connection with Examples 5.1 and 5.2 of Fuchs v. Commissioner.
54. 66 T.C. 41 (1976), affd. without opinion, 566 F.2d 1182 [unpublished order dated
10-25-77] (9th Cir. 1977).
55. The State's community property law provided that the payment of insurance pre-
miums with community funds made the insurance policy community property. Id. at 43. Cf.
Scott v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
56. In one respect, Meyer may appear to be a term deletion case in that the court's
opinion affects the policy terms by taking away from S, 50% of the interest granted to S by
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Freedman v. United States,57 and Daubert v. United States,58
are factually similar to Meyer and are additional examples of term
addition cases in which the terms of a life insurance policy (show-
ing that only D's spouse had incidents of ownership) are affected
by the local community property law. In Freedman and Daubert,
as in Meyer, the court held that one half of the policy proceeds
was.includable in D's gross estate under Section 2042(2). 51
Still other examples of cases factually similar to Meyer, are Cat-
alano v. United States,0 Kern v. United States"1 (as it relates to
the second insurance policy considered therein), 2 and Madsen v.
Commissioner.13 In Catalano,64 Kern, 5 and Madsen,"6 the outside
factors (local community property law) were regarded by the
courts as having the potential to dominate the policy factors (pol-
icy terms which showed that only D's spouse had incidents of
ownership) .67
those terms. However, under the definitions employed in this article, a case is a term dele-
tion case if outside factors subtract from the decedent's incidents of ownership, and a case
is a term addition case if outside factors add to the decedent's incidents of ownership.
Meyer, therefore, is clearly a term addition case.
57. 382 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1967).
58. 533 F. Supp 66 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
59. To a similar effect, see Rev. Rul. 228, 1967-2 C.B. 331.
60. 429 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1969).
61. 491 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1974).
62. The second policy in Kern is designated as "Policy No. 505389," issued on March
3, 1965, by Northern Life in the amount of $10,000. Id. at 438.
63. 659 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1981).
64. In Catalano, the court examined State community property law and concluded
that D was granted no incidents of ownership under local law. To a similar effect, see Estate
of Saia v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 515 (1974).
65. As to the second policy considered in Kern, the court reached no final decision
regarding ownership because of the need to consider the impact of an additional State stat-
ute on remand. Kern, 491 F.2d at 439-440.
66. In Madsen, an issue of local law was certified by the Court of Appeals to the
State supreme court. The opinion of the State supreme court, 97 Wn.2d 792 (1982) (unoffi-
cially reported at 82-2 USTC par. 13, 495), led the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to con-
clude that the outside factors (local community property law) gave D incidents of ownership
in the policy. The subsequent opinion of the court of appeals in Madsen is reported at 690
F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1982).
67. As to the first policy considered in Kern (designated "Policy No. 467-750," issued
on January 15, 1958, by Northern Life in the amount of $20,000), a somewhat different issue
was presented. There was a typed endorsement to the first policy, part of the policy terms,
which in very explicit language (much stronger and clearer than the language appearing in
the second policy) declared that D's spouse was to have all incidents of ownership and that
D was to have none. The court, in this instance, regarded the policy factors to be controlling
when construed in the light of the applicable state law. Therefore, as to the first policy,
Kern is not a term deletion or a term addition case. D was held to have no incidents of
ownership in the first policy, and it was not includable in D's gross estate under Section
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Not all attempts by the Internal Revenue Service to prove inci-
dents of ownership by reference to local law have been successful.
In Estate of Crosley v. Commissioner,8 D, who was insured under
various life insurance policies, established an irrevocable trust to
which he transferred all of his incidents of ownership in the poli-
cies. Formal assignments for each of the policies were filed with
the respective insurance companies on forms provided by the com-
panies. Thus, the policy factors showed that D held no incidents of
ownership at his death. The IRS argued that the local trust law
(outside factors) showed the trust to be a sham or to have termi-
nated and that D, therefore, retained the incidents of ownership at
death. The court examined the applicable State law and the evi-
dence before it and concluded that D held no incidents of owner-
ship once the policies were assigned.
A similar result was reached in Estate of Gorby v. Commis-
sioner.6 9 In that case, D was the insured under two life insurance
policies. In order to transfer all of his incidents of ownership in the
policies to his spouse, D executed assignment documents which
were provided by, and subsequently filed with, the insurance com-
panies. Thus, as in Crosley, the policy factors showed that D held
no incidents of ownership at his death. The IRS argued that, when
the provisions of State law (outside factors) were applied to the
policy terms, D's assignments were invalidated and D, therefore,
died possessing incidents of ownership. The court examined the lo-
cal statutory and case law and held that the policy terms permit-
ted the assignments and that D had divested himself of all inci-
dents of ownership.
In Parson v. United States,70 when D applied for a life insurance
policy, he designated his spouse as the one who was to possess all
of the incidents of ownership. Once more, the policy factors
showed that D held no incidents of ownership at his death. But the
IRS argued that, under the provisions of the State community
property law (outside factors), D possessed one half of the inci-
dents of ownership at death, notwithstanding the policy terms
2042(2). Kern, 491 F.2d at 438-439.
68. 47 T.C. 310 (1966).
69. 53 T.C. 80 (1969).
70. 460 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1972). Only Issue I is dealt with in the Text. Id. at 228-32.
In Issue II the policy terms showed that D was the owner of 14 policies on his life which
were obtained by D prior to moving with his spouse into a community property state. The
court applied the State community property law in holding that D held all incidents of
ownership in the policies. Id. at 232-34.
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shown by the application. The court disagreed, concluding that,
when the policy factors were examined under the applicable local
law, D held no incidents in the policy, having validly assigned
them to his spouse.71
In none of the term addition cases considered in connection with
Example 1.2 does the court's opinion cite RIHT or discuss the "pol-
icy matters vs. outside matters" issue.
4. General Comments
Regardless of whether these opinions discuss RIHT and regard-
less of whether they have the effect of deleting or adding policy
terms, they nevertheless provide authority for the proposition that,
notwithstanding the policy factors rule set out in RIHT, such fac-
tors do not always control the result under Section 2042(2). At
least one outside factor-the provisions of State law-can override
the policy factors. This is a position articulated with some consis-
tency, albeit not universally, in various Section 2042(2) cases de-
cided after (as well as before) RIHT.
It seems reasonable to conclude that a decedent can have inci-
dents of ownership in a life insurance policy only if such rights
exist when the insurance contract is construed under the applica-
ble provisions of State law. The principle is certainly not foreign to
the Federal tax law in general 2 or to the Estate Tax statute in
particular.7 3 Specifically, with respect to Section 2042, the regula-
tions provide that, "in determining whether or not a decedent pos-
sessed any incidents of ownership in a policy or any part of a pol-
icy, regard must be given to the effect of the State or other
applicable law upon the terms of the policy. ' 74 The Tax Court
elaborated on this principle in Watson v. Commissioner, 75 stating
71. Accord: Bintliff v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd. as to
this point, 462 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1972); Estate of McKee v. Comm'r, par. 78, 108 T.C.M. (P-
H) (1978). See also, supra note 64.
72. See, generally, Estate of Bosch v. Comm'r, 387 U.S. 456 (1957).
73. See, e.g., Estate Tax Section 2033, and Sections 20.2041-2(e), 20.2056(b)-l(g), Ex.
(8), and 20.2042-1(c)(5), Estate Tax Regs.
74. Section 20-2042-1(c)(5), Estate Tax Regs. Dawson v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 837 (1972),
aff'd. in unpublished order, 480 F.2d 917 (3rd Cir. 1973).
75. Par. 77,268 T.C.M. (P-H) (1977) at 1088. Similarly, in Estate of Gorby v.
Comm'r, discussed in connection with Example 1.2, the Tax Court stated: "While Federal
law determines whether the decedent's rights under the policies require the insurance pro-
ceeds to be included in his gross estate, we must look to the applicable State law to ascer-
tain the nature of decedent's rights under the policy." Gorby, 53 T.C. at 85. This generally
accepted rule finds its roots in a Supreme Court opinion which predates the current version




although the question [of] whether incidents of ownership found to be pos-
sessed by the decedent are sufficient to bring section 2042 into play is a
question of Federal law, the question of what, if any, incidents of ownership
the decedent had, and his legal power in respect thereof, ultimately depends
upon an analysis of the facts in light of the applicable state law.
Nothing in the RIHT opinion suggests that the court of appeals
intended to modify this accepted principle. It seems fairly clear,
from an analysis of the cases subsequent to RIHT, that the courts
have not been hesitant to conclude that policy factors do give way
to the provisions of local law when there is a conflict between the
two. Thus, in Examples 1.1 and 1.2, it follows that the outside fac-
tors would operate to negate the policy factors, notwithstanding
the general rule enunciated in RIHT. The result is that, at death,
D would not have the incident of ownership in the term deletion
case (Example 1.1) and would have the incident of ownership in the
term addition case (Example 1.2).
One point becomes apparent when one analyzes the cases bear-
ing on Examples 1.1 and 1.2. In a term deletion case (in which
outside factors eliminate the decedent's incidents), the IRS is
likely to argue that the policy factors are not controlling, and in a
term addition case (in which outside factors increase the dece-
dent's incidents), the IRS is likely to argue that the outside factors
are controlling. The matter of how this inconsistent IRS approach
squares with the RIHT rationale is dealt with below.76
The remaining examples (Example 2.1 through Example 5.2)
deal directly with specific outside factors other than State law.
However, the provisions of local law often have a bearing on the
nature and scope of these additional factors, and the principle con-
sidered in connection with Examples 1.1 and 1.2 will continue to be
relevant. Moreover, it will be seen that, while there are post-RIHT
Section 2042(2) opinions dealing with outside factors which do not
discuss the RIHT case at all, not all courts have been reticent to
tackle RIHT head on.
C. The Effect of Court Orders
1. Examples
EXAMPLE 2.1: TERM DELETION CASE
76. The IRS thinking on this point was disclosed when the IRS made its arguments
in Infante v. Comm'r, as discussed below in connection with Example 3.2.
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Policy Factors: The policy terms state that, at death, D had the right to
change the beneficiaries on the policy.
Outside Factors: Pursuant to the order of a state court, D did not have that
right at death.
EXAMPLE 2.2: TERM ADDITION CASE
Policy Factors: The policy terms do not give D the right to change the ben-
eficiaries on the policy.
Outside Factors: Pursuant to the order of a state court, D did have that
right at death.
The examples present the question of whether the provisions of
a court order can be more important than the terms of the insur-
ance policy. This question can be broken down into two parts: If
the policy terms grant the decedent an incident of ownership but a
court order eliminates or nullifies that right or power, does Section
2042(2) apply? If the policy terms do not grant the decedent an
incident ownership, but a court order does grant the decedent an
incident, does Section 2042(2) apply?
These examples contemplate a situation where a state court or-
der affecting the decedent eliminates or grants rights in an insur-
ance policy on the decedent's life, and the court order thereby ef-
fectively deletes terms from or adds terms to the insurance
contract. Logically, the rule to be applied here should not differ
from the rule that was applied in connection with Examples 1.1 and
1.2.
2. Term Deletion Cases
In Beauregard v. Commissioner,7 the policy on D's life gave D
the right to designate and change the beneficiaries. However,
under a divorce settlement agreement which was incorporated into
a court decree, D was required to maintain his minor children as
the beneficiaries. D died during the children's minority, and there-
fore, at the time of D's death, the court order operated to preclude
D from exercising the right which had been granted to him by the
policy terms.
The Tax Court held that the policy factors (the terms of the in-
surance contract) were overridden by the outside factors (the court
decree which was binding on D). The outside factors showed that
the right to change beneficiaries, granted to D by the policy terms,
was not an incident of ownership.
The Internal Revenue Service pointed to another incident of
77. 74 T.C. 603 (1980).
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ownership granted to D by the policy terms-the right to decide
upon the settlement options-and the IRS argued that this was
also an incident which warranted includability in D's estate. Here
again, the court concluded that a policy factor was overridden by
an outside factor. In this instance, the outside factor was a provi-
sion of state law, pursuant to which the guardian of the benefi-
ciaries could have required a lump sum payment to the benefi-
ciaries, notwithstanding any settlement option selected by D. The
court concluded that this legal right of the guardian under local
law effectively divested D of this incident of ownership. In this re-
spect, Beauregard is similar to the Carlstrom decision.
In view of the fact that, under the Tax Court's analysis, D did
not have at death an incident of ownership in the life insurance
policy, the court held that the proceeds were not includable in D's
gross estate under Section 2042(2). Significantly, the court ob-
served that the rights granted D by the policy "fall squarely within
the term 'incidents of ownership',"78 and the court noted that,
under RIHT, the policy facts should predominate.79 However, the
opinion states that "both parties . . . appear to proceed upon the
tacit assumption that a strict application of the so-called 'policy
facts' doctrine is here inappropriate and we accordingly accept the
case in this posture and reach our decision on this basis."80
3. Term Addition Cases
No decided cases have been found which deal with a court order
in the context of Example 2.2. See the General Comments which
follow.
4. General Comments
In reaching its conclusion that D had an incident of ownership in
the policy, notwithstanding the policy terms, the court in Beaure-
gard appears to have been somewhat concerned with the seeming
inconsistency of its holding with the "predominance of policy
facts" principle articulated in RIHT. To avoid any conflict with
RIHT, the court said that is was accepting the case in the posture
78. Id. at 607.
79. Id. note 2. In this footnote, the court acknowledged the status of RIHT as " a
leading case in this area" and suggested that the cases which follow policy facts "do so on
the basis that the express language of the policy prevails over the unenforceable intentions
of the parties."
80. Id. See, in this regard, the General Comments which follow.
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in which the parties seemed to have presented it i.e., that it was
not appropriate to apply the RIHT doctrine. -
The Tax Court in Beauregard appears to suggest that the RIHT
case would require a court order to be ignored when that order is
incompatible the terms of a life insurance policy. Perhaps that is
true under one reading of the case, but, for the reasons discussed
in connection with the first examples, it would appear that the
Court of Appeals in RIHT did not intend its policy facts principle
to be applied in the Beauregard setting.
Actually, the result reached by the Tax Court is fully compatible
with the result reached in Examples 1.1 and 1.2. In those examples,
we saw a generally recognized exception to the policy facts ap-
proach in cases where applicable local law speaks directly to the
incidents of ownership issue. The local law to be applied in a given
case can be found in the statutory law of the State, in the decisions
of the supreme court of the State, and, indeed, in the decision (and
orders) of the lower courts of the State. As a result, the issue
presented in Examples 2.1 and 2.2 is, essentially, a more specialized
manifestation of the issue presented in Examples 1.1 and 1.2.8"
For an exception to RIHT to be available on these facts, the law
applied by the local court must, of necessity, be consistent with the
law of the State as reflected in the opinions of the Supreme Court
of the State,82 and the local court's order must be binding on the
decedent." Both of these elements were present in Beauregard,
and the case was, therefore, properly decided.
In the Examples 2.1 and 2.2, it follows that the outside factors
would operate to negate the policy factors, notwithstanding the
general rule in RIHT. This means that, at death, D would not pos-
81. The Tax Court in Beauregard in fact discussed cases falling within the ambit of
Example 1.1, although the court did not expressly view those cases as presenting an excep-
tion to the RIHT rationale.
82. Estate of Bosch v. Comm'r, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). The Bosch case was cited and
applied by the Tax Court in Beauregard. In Bosch, the Supreme Court stated:
[wihen the application of a federal statute is involved, the decision of a state trial
court as to an underlying issue of state law should a fortiori not be controlling. This
is but an application of the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, where state law as
announced by the highest court of the State is to be followed. This is not a diversity
case but the same principle may be applied for the same reasons, viz., the underlying
substantive rule involved is based on state law and the State's highest court is the
best authority on its own law. If there be no decision by that court then federal au-
thorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving "proper regard" to
relevant rulings of other courts of the State.
Id. at 465.
83. Cf. Rev. Rul. 142, 1973-1 C.B. 405. See Beauregard, 74 T.C. at 605.
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sess the incident of ownership in the term deletion case (Example
2.1) and would possess the incident of ownership in the term addi-
tion case (Example 2.2).
While no cases have been found dealing with a court order in a
term addition context (Example 2.2), it would seem that the ap-
proach taken in Beauregard should appropriately be applied here
as well. Thus, a state court order which gives D an incident of own-
ership in a policy should warrant includability in D's gross estate
under Section 2042(2), even though the policy language makes no
mention of D or of D's possession of that incident. This would gen-
erally be the result when a binding court order establishes legal
rights which, under the law of the jurisdiction, clearly takes prece-
dence over any contrary provisions in an insurance contract.
D. The Effect of Formal "Side" Arrangements
1. Examples
EXAMPLE 3.1: TERM DELETION CASE
Policy Factors: The policy terms state that, at death, D had the right to
change the beneficiaries on the policy.
Outside Factors: Pursuant to a written agreement between D and X, D as-
signed his right to X.
EXAMPLE 3.2: TERM ADDITION CASE
Policy Factors: The policy terms do not give D the right to change the ben-
eficiaries on the policy; rather they give that right to X.
Outside Factors: Pursuant to a written agreement between D and X, X as-
signed the right to D so that, at D's death, D had the right to change the
beneficiaries on the policy.
The examples present the question of whether the provisions of
a written agreement between the decedent and a third party can
be more important than the terms of the insurance policy. This
question can be broken down into two parts: If the policy terms
grant the decedent an incident of ownership, and the decedent, in
a written instrument, has assigned that right or power to a third
party, does Section 2042(2) apply? If the policy terms do not grant
the decedent an incident ownership, and a third party, in a written
instrument, has assigned an incident of ownership to the decedent,
does Section 2042(2) apply?
These examples envision the existence of a formal "side" ar-
rangement, such as written agreement to which the insurance com-
pany is not a party, which impacts upon the rights which the dece-
dent has at death in the life insurance policy.
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2. Term Deletion Cases
In First National Bank of Birmingham v. United States,84 D
%,as one of four corporate shareholders who entered into a buy-sell
agreement related to the disposition of their shares of stock. To
fund this agreement, the four shareholders obtained policies of in-
surance on their respective lives. Under the terms of the insurance
contract, each shareholder had the right to designate the benefi-
ciaries of $20,000 of proceeds. Pursuant to the terms of a separate
written agreement, each shareholder named the other three share-
holders as the beneficiaries of $15,000 of proceeds ($5,000 to each
of the three others).
At D's death, the IRS claimed that the $15,000 of proceeds paya-
ble to the other three shareholders was includable in D's gross es-
tate under Section 2042(2). 85 The IRS looked to the policy factors
which showed that D had the power to designate the beneficiaries
under the terms of the insurance contract.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, without citing
RIHT,8 held that D did not at death have any incidents of owner-
ship for Section 2042(2) purposes. The court based its opinion on
the outside factors, specifically the contract signed by the share-
holders regarding the designation of beneficiaries. The IRS argued
that, under the policy terms, D had the right to change the benefi-
ciaries up to the moment of death and that there was nothing in
the side agreement to bind D not to exercise that power. The
Court disagreed, pointing out that when the side agreement was
construed under State law, D was indeed bound not to change the
beneficiary. Because D's surrender of the right was enforceable
under local law. D was precluded from exercising that incident of
ownership at death.
A contrary result was reached by the district court in Puchner v.
United States.87 In that case, D and D's fiance (S) executed a
binding pre-nuptial agreement, pursuant to which D agreed to
transfer a life insurance policy to an irrevocable trust established
84. 358 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1966). Birmingham was decided more than two months
after the decision in RIHT. See note 86, infra.
85. The remaining $5,000 out of the $20,000 total proceeds was payable to D's estate
and was, therefore, includable under Estate Tax Section 2042(1). This point was not at issue
in Birmingham.
86. RIHT was decided on January 11,1966. Birmingham was decided on March 29,
1966.
87. 274 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Wisc. 1967).
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by D and S.88 Under the terms of the policy, D was both the owner
and the insured. At D's death, D had taken no action to effect that
transfer, nor had D designated the trust as the beneficiary of the
proceeds. D had designated S as the beneficiary. When S was paid
by the insurance company shortly after D's death, S turned the
proceeds over to the trust.
The IRS argued that the policy factors were controlling and that
includability was warranted under Section 2042(2). The court
agreed that the proceeds of the policy were includable in D's gross
estate. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the terms of
the insurance contract, showing that D remained the owner of the
policy, able to exercise all incidents of ownership up to his date of
death. The court concluded that D held the incidents in the policy
notwithstanding the side agreement. Surprisingly, the court gave
no consideration at all to the ramifications of the contractual obli-
gation between D and S under local law. The court simply cited
RIHT as authority for its decision on this point.
A decision aligned closely to Birmingham was achieved by the
Tax Court in Estate of Bartlett v. Commissioner,89 in which the
court relied on both Birmingham and RIHT to support its conclu-
sion that the proceeds of life insurance policies were not included
in D's gross estate under Section 2042(2).
In Bartlett, a term deletion case, D owned several insurance pol-
icies on his own life. D established an irrevocable and unamend-
able trust, assigning in the written trust agreement all of his inci-
dents of ownership in the policies to the trustee. Although the
policy terms required the insurance company to be notified of the
assignments, D did not provide such notification.
The IRS argued includability based on the terms of the insur-
ance policy which showed that D, and not the trustee, held the
incidents of ownership. D would have to suffer the consequences of
not taking the formal step of notifying the insurance company.
The court disagreed with the IRS and relied on outside factors to
support its holding. The assignment, held the court, was binding
under local law. The failure to notify the insurance company
meant only that the insurance company was not bound, and not
88. At one point in the opinion, the court said that D "agreed to make the Trust the
beneficiary" of the life insurance policy. Id. at 707. At another point in the opinion, the
court said that D "agreed to contribute New York Life Insurance Policy No. 17703423 of
which he was the owner and the insured as an asset of the Trust."Id. at 709. [Emphasis
added.]
89. 54 T.C. 1590 (1970).
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that the assignments themselves were not valid. The court stated
that while D might technically have had the ability to exercise in-
cidents of ownership, such action would have been a breach of the
trust agreement under state law and a fraud on the trustee. A mere
"ability" to affect an insurance policy is not tantamount to a
"right" to do so, the court observed, and only a "right" can fit the
definition of an incident of ownership.90
Given the outside factors in this case-the binding side agree-
ment with the trustee and the ramifications of that agreement
under local law91-the Tax Court concluded that the policy factors
should not control.
3. Term Addition Cases
Among the term addition cases in this category is Estate of In-
fante v. Commissioner,92 wherein two partners, D and E, pur-
chased life insurance to carry out the partnership agreement's
buyout plan. D became the owner and the beneficiary of a policy
insuring E's life, and E became the owner and the beneficiary of a
policy insuring D's life. Under the terms of the policies, all inci-
dents of ownership were held by the respective owners, and not by
the insureds.
The primary outside factor in this case was the partnership
agreement, which provided, inter alia, that E could not change the
beneficiary (E) of the policy insuring D's life without the consent
of D. 3 The Internal Revenue Service argued that the partnership
agreement thus served to give D an incident of ownership insuring
90. In this analysis, the Tax Court differs with the following statement appearing in
the RIHT opinion: "For the decedent had some powers-perhaps not rights, but pow-
ers-which could, if exercised alone or in conjunction with another, affect the disposition of
some or all of the proceeds of the policy." RIHT, 365 F.2d at 11. Moreover, the court of
appeals in RIHT did not consider it significant that D might have owed a duty to his father
or that the father might have had an action against D. See note 132, infra.
91. In Bartlett, the Tax Court rejected the argument of the IRS that local law can be
consulted in a Section 2042(2) case for only for the limited purpose of interpreting the pro-
visions appearing on the face of the policy. The IRS had contended that it was inappropri-
ate to examine state law to determine if the assignment was effective notwithstanding the
language in the insurance contract. The court stated that this argument by the IRS was an
inappropriate extension of the "policy facts" cases and was inconsistent with the Govern-
ment's own regulations - Section 20.2042-1(c)(5), Estate Tax Regs. "Local law," observed
the Tax Court, "is commonly omitted from the face of the policy. And local law may require
that external provisions be added to the policy." Bartlett, 54 T.C. at 1598.
92. Par. 70,206 P-H Memo TC (1970)
93. Allowing a change of beneficiary would defeat the buyout plan. The purpose of.
having the proceeds payable to E was to provide E with the resources to purchase D's part-
nership interest at D's death.
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D's life-the right to consent to a change of beneficiary-and the
proceeds were, therefore, includable in D's gross estate at his death
under Section 2042(2). In effect, the IRS took the position that
outside factors added a term to the provisions of the insurance
contract, giving D an incident of ownership.
In making this argument, the IRS was aware that it was depart-
ing from the RIHT principle that the policy factors should control.
Here, the Government was asserting that an outside factor, the
terms of the partnership agreement, should be dispositive.
The IRS tried to rationalize its departure from RIHT by draw-
ing a distinction between (1) cases in which life insurance policies
confer incidents of ownership on a decedent, and collateral docu-
ments or agreements purport to negate those incidents (these
would be examples of "term deletion cases," as that term is used in
this article), and (2) cases in which life insurance policies confer no
incidents of ownership on a decedent, and collateral documents or
agreements purport to grant such incidents to the decedent (these
would be examples of "term addition cases," as that term is used
in this article).
The IRS took the position in Infante that the RIHT rationale
was applicable only in the term deletion cases and that the Gov-
ernment could, therefore, look beyond the policy factors in term
addition cases such as the instant one. The Tax Court refused to
accept this purported distinction between the term deletion and
term addition cases. The Court cited various pre-RIHT term addi-
tion cases94 to support its view that collateral agreements and doc-
uments could not create incidents of ownership not otherwise
granted by an insurance policy.
The Tax Court applied the RIHT principle in Infante and held
that the partnership agreement did not serve to confer an incident
of ownership on D. The court stated:
The decedent was given a single incident of ownership (the veto power) by a
collateral contract (the partnership agreement) for the sole purpose of in-
suring that the proceeds of the policy would be available in accordance with
the agreement between the partners and the survivor should purchase the
interest of the deceased partner. This does not impinge upon the policy it-
94. Comm'r v. Karagheusian's Estate, 233 F.2d 197 (2nd Cir. 1956); Comm'r v. Trega-
nowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2nd Cir. 1950); Altshuler v. United States, 169 F.Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo.
1958); and Bank of New York v. United States, 115 F.Supp. 375, 385 (D.C. N.Y. 1953). The
court went to great lengths to show how the Bank of New York case supported the proposi-
tion that side agreements cannot confer incidents of ownership. In fact, as the court admits,
the incident of ownership in that case was conferred exclusively by a trust agreement, and
the court's attempt to distinguish the case seems strained.
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self . .. [Riestrictions of the type utilized in this case, which are included
in the partnership agreement to insure that funds are available for the
purchase of a deceased partner's interest, should not form a basis for the
inclusion of the policy in the estate of the decedent where the decedent does
not otherwise possess any "incidents of ownership" under the policy itself.
. . . Even assuming that the policy and the partnership agreement must be
read together, and recognizing that the decedent's veto power constitutes an
"incident of ownership," ... to include the proceeds of the insurance in the
estate of the insured in this instance would be an unwarranted extension of
the statute.
9 5
On this basis, the Tax Court concluded that the proceeds of the
policy insuring D's life should not be included in D's Gross estate
under Section 2042(2).
In Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, e the Tax Court, did
not cite Infante97 and appears to take an opposite approach. The
life insurance policy in Thompson was purchased by a corporation
which, under the policy terms, held all incidents of ownership. The
corporation named itself beneficiary and paid all of the premiums.
The critical outside factor in Thompson was a separate contract
entered into by the corporation and D, pursuant to which the cor-
poration agreed to pay a portion of the proceeds of the policy (the
portion in excess of the cash surrender value at D's death) to bene-
ficiaries designated by D. D established an irrevocable trust, and
the corporation arranged to have the designated portion of the
proceeds paid to the trust.
The Internal Revenue Service again chose to emphasize the
95. Infante, Par. 70,206 T.C.M. (P-H) at 995. The Tax Court also attempted to de-
velop an "economic benefits" theory, pointing out that, under the partnership agreement,
each partner "gave up any right to control the flow of economic benefits for any purpose
other than the one specified in the agreement." Id. (Emphasis added]. In fact, the eco-
nomic benefit to D under the partnership agreement was arguably substantial since the
agreement contemplated that the proceeds of the insurance policy would be used to
purchase D's partnership interest at his death.
96. Par. 81,200 T.C.M. (P-H) (1981).
97. Estate of Infante was a "memorandum" opinion of the Tax Court. Such opinions
are not published by the Government in the official Tax Court reports. ("Memorandum"
opinions of the Tax Court are made available to the tax bar by commercial publishers.) The
Tax Court tends to assign "memorandum" status to essentially factual cases involving the
application of clearly established legal principles. "Memorandum" opinions, therefore, gen-
erally (although not always) involve cases which break no new legal ground. As a conse-
quence, such cases rarely are cited by the Tax Court as legal precedent in its subsequent
cases. (Even in cases where they are mentioned with approval, they are seldom relied on as
dispositive authority; any references to such opinions are usually discreetly tucked away in a
footnote.) Similarly, the Tax Court does not always feel compelled to explain away or distin-
guish a prior "memorandum" opinion whose conclusions (or, indeed, legal premises) are at
variance with the case at bar.
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outside factors, contending that D's right under the contract to
designate the beneficiary of a portion of the proceeds was an inci-
dent of ownership in an insurance policy on D's life." The Tax
Court agreed with the IRS and held that includability was war-
ranted under Section 2042(2).
The Tax Court acknowledged the general rule articulated in
RIHT that policy factors should govern the result in cases of this
nature. But the court pointed out that there could be exceptions to
this general rule. These exceptions would arise in the "rare circum-
stances" in which "evidence to the effect that 'policy facts' do not
conform to the intent of the parties thereunder ('intent facts')
overcome[s] the heavy presumption in favor of 'policy facts.'
The court added that
the legal relationships established by the policy may be altered by an ex-
trinsic, enforceable contract executed by those parties who have contractible
rights in the policy [footnote reference to Estate of Bartlett]. However, such
extrinsic contract will not be respected for tax purposes unless (1) the exis-
tence and provisions of the contract overcome the heavy predominance of
policy facts and (2) the contract is valid and enforceable under state law.100
The court observed that the contract between D and the corpo-
ration did not provide that, once D made a beneficiary designation,
D's choice of beneficiary was irrevocable, and the court concluded
that D held the right to change the beneficiary up to the moment
of his death, as required by Section 2042(2).
Arguing against includability, D's estate contended that the ir-
revocable trust was a third party beneficiary which could deprive D
of legally exercising his right to change the beneficiary under the
policy, with the result that D did not have that power at death.
However, after examining the applicable state law, the Tax Court
held that the trust held only an expectancy in the proceeds and
was not a third party beneficiary with enforceable rights.' 1
98. Although the corporation was wholly owned by D, the IRS does not appear to
have argued that the incidents of ownership held by the corporation should be attributed to
D. See generally n. 51, supra, and the related text.
99. Thompson, Par. 81,200 T.C.M. (P-H) at 644. Moreover, the court pointed out
that "[flor the same reasons that 'intent facts' rarely predominate over 'policy facts,' extrin-
sic contracts and the provisions thereunder will be respected for tax purposes only if estab-
lished by a heavy predominance of the evidence." Id. at 644, n.3. The court adopted this
standard to deal with the concerns expressed by the Court of Appeals in RIHT relating to
the evidentiary problems that would flow from adopting a rule which looked to the dece-
dent's intentions ("intent facts"). Id.
100. Thompson, Par. 81,200 T.M.C. (P-H) at 644.
101. Compare Morton v. United States, discussed in connection with Example 1.1.
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The clear thrust of the Tax Court's opinion in Thompson is that,
in an appropriate term addition case, an outside factor showing
"intent facts," such as a side agreement, can override policy factors
for the purposes of Section 2042(2).
This theme was continued by the Tax Court in Estate of Tomer-
lin v. Commissioner,102 a case with facts fairly similar to those of
Thompson. A corporation purchased a life insurance policy on the
life of D and paid all premiums. Under the terms of the policy, the
corporation had all incidents of ownership. The corporation named
itself and D's children as the beneficiaries. Under a separate writ-
ten agreement, the corporation and D agreed that D was to have
the right to designate the beneficiaries under the policy, as well as
certain other rights respecting the policy.
The court held that D had incidents of ownership in the policy
at his death and that Section 2042(2) applied. D's estate had ar-
gued that only policy factors should be considered in making the
determination of includability and, since D was nowhere men-
tioned in the policy, D should not be viewed as having an incident
of ownership. In rejecting this argument, the court noted the simi-
larity of the instant case to Thompson and concluded it was per-
missible to examine the side agreement between D and the corpo-
ration to determine what rights respecting the insurance policy
were granted to D by that contract.
While Tomerlin is another term addition case holding that
outside factors can control over policy factors, the opinion at no
point cites RIHT or discusses the evidentiary standards deemed
important in the Thompson opinion.
4. General Comments
Slavish adherence to the rule in RIHT when written side ar-
rangements are involved can lead to incongruous results. For ex-
ample, in the term deletion case, D's rights under an insurance pol-
icy could be formally assigned by him to a third party in a binding
side agreement, and, as .a practical matter, D would be precluded
from exercising those rights. Still, a rigid application of RIHT
leads to the conclusion that D has incidents of ownership because
that is what the policy terms say. And, in the term addition case, a
binding side agreement could grant to D certain rights to affect an
insurance policy, and, as a practical matter, D would possess signif-
icant incidents of ownership. Nevertheless, a rigid application of
102. Thompson, Par. 86,147 T.C.M. (P-H) (1986).
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RIHT leads to the conclusion that D has no such incidents because
none are granted to him by the policy terms.
Looking to the decided cases for a clear exposition of the law in
this area is of no avail, for the cases are not consistent. When there
is a conflict between the terms of the insurance policy (policy fac-
tors) and the terms of a written agreement made by the decedent
and a third party (outside factors), the applicable principles for
Section 2042(2) purposes are at best confused.
In Birmingham the court held that the terms of the agreement
bound D not to exercise the rights granted by the policy terms. In
so holding, the court made no mention of RIHT or of the RIHT
principle that policy factors should be dominant. On the other
hand, the court in Puchner deferred to the RIHT principle and
held that the terms of a written side agreement could not serve to
negate incidents of ownership granted to D by the insurance
policy.
Puchner, like Birmingham, involved a written side agreement
between the decedent and a third party which was binding under
local law. However, Puchner, relying on RIHT, gave great weight
to the fact that the policy terms showed D to have the ability to
exercise incidents at death.'03 In contrast, Bartlett pointed out
that D's mere ability to affect an insurance policy is not the same
as a right to do so, and the court did not believe that RIHT re-
quired a contrary conclusion. As a result, because D was bound by
a trust agreement not to exercise the powers granted by the policy,
D was held in Bartlett not to possess incidents of ownership in the
policy.
In Infante, the RIHT principle was acknowledged by the Tax
Court in a case in which the terms of the policy gave D no inci-
dents of ownership, but the terms of a partnership agreement did.
The court concluded that the policy proceeds were not includable
in D's gross estate. The court did not squarely base its decision on
RIHT, preferring instead to rely on what is essentially a tax policy
argument-that incidents of ownership commonly granted by busi-
ness buyout agreements should not be within the scope of Section
2042(2).
However, in a case involving an agreement between D and a cor-
poration which owned a policy on D's life-Thompson-the Tax
Court held that the side agreement did give D an incident of own-
103. The decedent in Birmingham also had the ability to exercise the incidents pursu-
ant to the policy terms, but there the court did not view that fact as significant.
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ership in the insurance policy. The court viewed the case as involv-
ing the application of an exception to the RIHT principle. The
court believed a divergence from RIHT was necessitated by the ex-
istence of a binding contract which was valid and enforceable. The
Tax Court relied on Thompson in reaching a similar result in
Tomerlin (in a case which makes no reference to RIHT).
The best rule in this area would be one that avoids the incongru-
ities that are inherent in ignoring a significant right that is granted
in a binding agreement-one which is enforceable under the appli-
cable State contract law. In the term deletion context, the contract
would have to grant all of the decedent's rights to a third party.
The local law must be such that, if the decedent were to exercise a
power which he technically possessed under the unchanged terms
of the insurance policy, that action would be an actionable breach
of the contract.0 4 In the term addition context, the contract would
have to grant to the decedent a right in connection with the policy
which, if granted directly by the policy, would meet the definition
of an incident of ownership. The right granted to the decedent
must be one which can be enforced under the provisions of local
law.1
0 5
Applying this rule to the current examples (3.1 and 3.2) and as-
suming the agreement to be binding, it follows that the outside
factors would operate to negate the policy factors. Therefore, in
the term deletion case (Example 3.1), D would not possess an inci-
104. See, e.g., Estate of Bartlett v. Comm'r, supra, wherein the court, in concluding
that D had effectively assigned his incidents of ownership in a side agreement, stated:
While the insured could possibly have cashed in some of the policies or could have
exercised a second assignment with notice thereof to the insurers, any such action on
his part would have constituted a breach of the trust agreement and would have
amounted to fraud against the bank, as assignee and trustee.
Bartlett, 54 T.C. at 1597.
Cf. Estate of Bloch v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 850, (1982), wherein the court stated:
When decedent used the life insurance owned by the 1946 trust as collateral for bank
loans in which he had a personal interest, he acted contrary to the provisions of the
trust agreement and clearly in breach of his duty as trustee of undivided loyalty to
the beneficiaries.
Although decedent may have benefited from his wrongful use of the policies during
his lifetime and thus enhanced the value of his estate, we do not think those benefits
permit the proceeds of the policies to be included in the gross estate.
Id. at 862, 863-64.
105. E.g., see note 75, supra, and the associated quotation from Estate of Watson v.
Comm'r. See, generally, Estate of Fuchs v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 199, 204-206 (1966). See also
Estate of Beauregard v. Comm'r, discussed in connection with Example 2.1, 74 T.C. at 607,
n.2; Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461, 466 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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dent of ownership, and, in the term addition case (Example 3.2), D
would possess an incident of ownership."' 6
E. The Effect of Informal "Side" Arrangements
1. Examples
EXAMPLE 4.1: TERM DELETION CASE
Policy Factors: The policy terms state that, at death, D had the right to
change the beneficiaries on the policy.
Outside Factors: Pursuant to an informal arrangement or understanding be-
tween D and X, that right is exercisable only by X.
EXAMPLE 4.2: TERM ADDITION CASE
Policy Factors: The policy terms do not give D the right to change benefi-
ciaries on the policy; rather they give that right to X.
Outside Factors: Pursuant to an informal arrangement or understanding be-
tween D and X, that right is exercisable by D.
The examples present the question of whether an informal ar-
rangement or -understanding between the decedent and a third
party can be more important than the terms of the insurance pol-
icy. This question can be broken down into two parts: If the policy
terms grant the decedent an incident of ownership but, pursuant
to an informal arrangement or understanding, that right or power
is exercisable only by a third party, does Section 2042(2) apply? If
the policy terms do not grant the decedent an incident of owner-
106. An additional issue is raised when the "side" agreement between X and D is a
trust agreement. Suppose that X owns all incidents of ownership in a policy insuring D's
life. Suppose that X and D execute a written trust agreement, pursuant to which X trans-
fers all of the incidents of ownership in the policy, along with funds for maintaining the
policy, to D, to hold in trust solely for the benefit of Y (unrelated to D). It has been argued
on these facts that, as a result of the agreement between X and D, D holds incidents, albeit
as a fiduciary, for Section 2042(2) purposes and that the proceeds would be includable in
D's gross estate at D's death. See Rev. Rul. 261, 1976-2 C.B. 276. See also note 25, supra,
and the associated text.
While the IRS received some judicial support for this position, e.g., Rose v. United States,
511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975), it was largely unsuccessful in litigation, e.g., Estate of Skifter v.
Comm'r, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972). As a result, the IRS reversed its position in Rev. Rul.
179, 1984-2 C.B. 195, giving weight to the facts that (1) the decedent had neither transferred
nor retained an interest in the policy, and (2) the decedent's powers, held as a fiduciary,
were not exercisable for the decedent's personal benefit. Under the rationale of many cases,
the economic benefits argument alone would be sufficient to take the case out of Section
2042(2) because there would be no incident of ownership. See Part I.B., supra.
It may be possible, based on Skifter and Revenue Ruling 84-179, to develop an argument,
in a non-fiduciary case presenting the issue in Example 3.2, that includability in D's gross
estate is not warranted when D did not retain the power D holds. However, success in the
non-fiduciary context would be doubtful, particularly in the usual situation where D is able
to exercise the power for D's personal benefit. See, e.g., the Thompson and Tomerlin cases
discussed in the text, accompanying notes 96 and 102, supra.
Duquesne Law Review
ship but, pursuant to an informal arrangement or understanding,
the decedent does have an incident, does Section 2042(2) apply?
These examples are similar to Examples 3.1 and 3.2, except that
the "side" arrangement here, while ostensibly impacting on the de-
cedent's rights under the insurance policy, is not reduced to a for-
mal writing.
2. Term Deletion Cases
Obviously, the prime example of a term deletion case in this con-
text is the RIHT case itself, involving an understanding between D
and D's father that the father held all incidents of ownership in a
policy insuring D's life. The father had purchased the policy, paid
all premiums, and kept the policy in his possession. D understood
that he could never exercise (for his own benefit) any of the vari-
ous incidents of ownership that were granted to him by the insur-
ance contract. The court of appeals held that the policy factors
controlled and that D held incidents of ownership in the policy at
D's death, despite the outside factors which showed the clear un-
derstanding between D and his father. The court held that the
outside factors (the "intent facts") were not relevant for purposes
of Section 2042(2).
A similar result was reached by the Court of Claims in Kearns v.
United States,"7 involving two insurance policies on D's life, the
terms of which granted D certain rights, including the right to
change the beneficiaries. A family corporation (previously a part-
nership), which was the designated beneficiary under both policies,
paid all premiums and carried the policies on its books as a corpo-
rate asset. The corporation was regarded by its officers and D as
the owner of the policy, and the corporation assigned the policies,
with D's consent, as collateral for corporate loans. On one occasion,
when the business was incorporated, D changed the beneficiary
designation from the partnership to the Corporation. Otherwise,
D's actions and statements showed that D did not consider the
policies to be his property, but rather that of the corporation.
D's estate argued that D did not have incidents of ownership in
the policies at D's death because he had assigned the policies to
the corporation (albeit not in writing), and when D exercised inci-
dents of ownership in the policies, he did so as a mere nominee on
behalf of the corporation.
Relying primarily on the Supreme Court opinion in Estate of
107. 399 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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Noel, but citing RIHT and other cases, the court held that the pol-
icy factors must control, stating that "where the decedent retains
rights under the policy he possesses incidents of ownership within
the meaning of section 2042(2). ' '18 The court observed that the
terms of the policy, which clearly granted rights to D, showed that
no assignment had been effectuated. Citing Noel, RIHT, and
Puchner,0 9 the court concluded that "[t]hese cases further deline-
ate the general rule that so-called 'policy facts' (i.e., reservation
rights in the contract of insurance) are not easily rebutted by ref-
erence to 'intent facts' or external circumstances."' 110
Much the same approach was adopted by the Tax Court in Es-
tate of De Vos v. Commissioner,"' although the opinion makes no
reference to RIHT. In that case, a divorce decree required D to
assign two life insurance policies on D's life to D's former spouse
(S), but D did not make any assignments. Instead, D merely made
S the beneficiary of a third policy on D's life. The policy factors
showed that D retained until death the right to change the benefi-
ciary of the third policy. Because the outside factors showed that
D had advised S that the third policy was a substitute for the poli-
cies referred to in the court order, D's estate claimed that D had
effectively assigned his right to change the beneficiary in that pol-
icy to S. The opinion points to the facts that the court decree had
not been modified and that S had not agreed to any substitution.
After an examination of the applicable State law, the court con-
cluded that, even if D and S had both intended to substitute the
third policies for the ones referred to in the decree, they could not
have done so without a securing a formal change in the provisions
of the decree. As a result, the policy factors controlled, and the
proceeds of the third policy were included in D's gross estate under
Section 2042(2).
In Nance v. United States,"' the policy factors showed that D
had an incident of ownership, but the outside factors showed that
D and his spouse (S) had an understanding, based on the insur-
ance company's usage and practice, which was known to both D
108. Id. at 229.
109. Puchner is discussed above in connection with Example 3.1. See supra note 87
and accompanying text.
110. Kearns, 399 F.2d at 230. Cf. Estate of Krischer v. Comm'r, Par. 73,171 T.C.M.
(P-H) (1973).
111. Par. 75,216 T.C.M. (P-H) (1975).
112. 430 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1970).
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and S," 3 that S would be treated by the company as holding all
incidents of ownership in the policy. The court of appeals ignored
the outside factors and held that the proceeds were includable in
D's gross estate under Section 2042(2). Citing Noel, the court held
that the extrinsic evidence (evidence pertaining to outside factors)
was irrelevant. The court did not cite RIHT, but, in holding that
policy factors alone were determinative of the result in that case,
the Nance opinion by implication applies the RIHT principle.
The Tax Court reached the opposite result in Estate of Barrata-
Lorton v. Commissioner,"' a case which bears some similarity to
Meyer discussed in connection with Example 1.2. As in Meyer, the
court applied the State community property law and concluded, at
least initially, that the insurance policy was owned 50% by each
spouse." 5 However, in Barrata-Lorton, the Tax Court examined
additional outside factors and held that D had assigned D's inci-
dents of ownership to D's spouse (S). The court considered the evi-
dence relating to the understanding between D and S and con-
cluded that there was an oral contract between them, and the
court examined the effect of that agreement under local law. Since
the outside facts showed that S held all of the incidents of owner-
ship at D's death, the proceeds were not included in D's gross es-
tate under Section 2042(2). The opinion makes no reference to
RIHT.
In a prior case, Estate of Wilmot v. Commissioner,"6 the tax
Court had achieved a similar result, stating that, from the evi-
dence, it was clear that D and S "intended" S to be the owner of
the policy and that the outside factors showed an "implied agree-
ment" between D and S which was "sufficient under local law" to
result in the policy being S's separate property." 7 Without citing
RIHT, Wilmot held that Section 2042(2) did not apply to D.
113. The knowledge and understanding of D and S are shown in the opinion of the
district court, unofficially reported at 21 AFTR2d 1702 (DC Ariz. 1968).
114. Par. 85,072 T.C.M. (P-H) (1985), affd., in an unpublished opinion, 787 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1986).
115. As was the case in Meyer, D's spouse (S) in Barrata-Lorton was designated 100%
owner of the policy, but the court ignored that designation and concluded that D and S each
owned 50% of the policy. To this extent, Barrata-Lorton is also an Example 1.2 case be-
cause the provisions of local law are viewed as giving D an incident of ownership not pro-
vided for in the insurance contract. But, as can be seen from the text, Barrata-Lorton takes
an additional step.
116. Par. 70,240 T.C.M. (P-H) (1970). Wilmot is similar to Barrata-Lorton in perti-
nent respects, but Barrata-Lorton makes no reference to Wilmot.
117. Wilmot, Par. 70,240 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1156.
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Estate of Crane v. Commissioner,'18 on facts similar to those of
Barrata-Lorton, reaches the same result, also without making any
reference to RIHT. However, the Crane opinion, while giving evi-
dentiary weight to an agreement between D and S,119 pays more
attention to the various ways in which D manifested D's intent to
transfer full ownership to S.120 The court regarded an inquiry into
D's intent as necessary for a determination as to whether D had
assigned his rights under the applicable State community property
law. Thus, in order to ascertain whether D had died possessing in-
cidents of ownership in a policy on D's life, it was necessary for the
court to examine both (1) D's statements on the application for in-
surance ("policy facts" under RIHT), and (2) the manifestations of
D's intentions when D made that application ("intent facts"' under
RIHT).121
3. Term Addition Cases
Prichard v. United States,22 is a term addition case in which a
decedent was found to have an incident of ownership in an insur-
ance policy despite the absence of any language in the insurance
contract pointing to such an incident.
In Prichard, D applied for a policy of insurance on D's life,
designating D's spouse (S) as the owner and beneficiary of the pol-
icy. The insurance company (GR) had required D to obtain this
coverage in order for D to receive a loan from GR in connection
with D's business activities. GR also required D to assign the pol-
icy, including the proceeds thereof, to GR as collateral for the loan.
The policy issued by GR stated that D, as the insured, made
application for the policy and that the insured and GR "under-
stood and agreed" that S had been designated "as the beneficiary
118. Par. 82,174 T.C.M. (P-H) (1982).
119. Id. at 744.
120. Id. at 744-755.
121. Various cases arising in community property law jurisdictions can present the
issues which are considered in this article. While on the surface many of them will appear to
be alike, the differences should be carefully noted. In some cases the terms of the policy, as
construed under local law, will control the result for estate tax purposes. In other cases, the
terms of the policy will be effectively modified by the local community property law so that,
for example, both the husband and wife will be viewed as owning a policy despite the fact
that the insurance application indicates that only one of them does. E.g., compare Parson v.
United States with Estate of Meyer v. Comm'r, both discussed in connection with Example
1.2. In still other cases, it may be possible for the terms of the policy to be effectively modi-
fied by other outside factors, such as a court decree, a formal agreement, or an informal
understanding.
122. 397 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1968).
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to control this policy" and that S was "the sole owner of this policy
and shall have the right to exercise all of the privileges, benefits,
rights, and options granted to the insured of the policy, 12 3 includ-
ing the right to assign the policy.
GR made the loan to both D and S, and both D and S signed the
document which effected an absolute assignment of the policy to
GR. Among other things, the written assignment made S's right to
the proceeds at D's death subordinate to that of GR.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, emphasizing the sub-
stance of the transaction rather than its form, held that D had an
incident of ownership in the policy when he died. The Court ac-
knowledged that under the applicable State community property
law, D had conveyed the property to S and S's ownership of the
policy was complete and sole. But the court looked to the realities
of the situation and stated that "the insurance policy and the loan
were indispensable parts of an integrated transaction."'" 4 The
court believed that the evidence clearly showed that S was named
as the owner "under the understanding, agreement, and arrange-
ment that the policy must be assigned' 12 5 in order to obtain the
loan made to the community (D and S). This was the intent from
the outset, according to the court, even before the decision was
made to make S the owner. S's actions were not out of donative
intent, the court explained; they were for the sole purpose of carry-
ing out the business arrangement between GR and D.
In view of the facts relative to the unwritten "understanding,
agreement, and arrangement," the court regarded D as receiving a
substantial economic benefit from having the policy stand as col-
lateral for the community debt, which was still outstanding at D's
death. The existence of the collateral helped prevent D's personal
assets from being used to pay the debt, and the court therefore
regarded D as enjoying "the economic benefit of protective insula-
tion from a potential claim."' 2 6
The court concluded that, from the inception, D held an incident
of ownership in the policy - the right to use the policy as collat-
eral to secure an agreement by GR to make the business loan, "fol-
lowed by the continuing economic benefit of the completed assign-
ment.' 27 Thus, without citing RIHT, the court concluded that the
123. Id. at 61.
124. Id. at 63.
125. Id.




outside factors should control and that includability was warranted
under Section 2042(2).12s
4. General Comments
These examples (4.1 and 4.2) deal with an informal arrangement
or understanding. Such arrangements or understandings, although
not manifested in a formal writing, can in fact amount to con-
tracts, such as in the Barrata-Lorton case, so that the rules consid-
ered in connection with the previous examples (3.1 and 3.2) would
logically be applicable. On the other hand, informal arrangements
or understandings can reflect nothing more than the parties' sub-
jective intent, such as in the Kearns case, and would seem to fall
squarely within the RIHT prohibition against the utilization of
"intent facts" to override "policy facts."
The question here is where to draw the line, and an examination
of the cases is not particularly helpful. If one compares the Kearns
and Barrata-Lorton cases, the critical point of distinction between
the two cases, if any, is not readily apparent. It is not a simple
matter to point to the factual circumstance in Barrata-Lorton
which compelled the court to convert the parties' intent into an
assignment of incidents of ownership, or to the missing factual ele-
ment in Kearns, the absence of which convinced the court that no
assignment had been effected.
Perhaps here, as well, the issue is whether, under the applicable
provisions of State law, the decedent possessed any incidents of
ownership. Did D assign or receive incidents of ownership under
the controlling law? While RIHT could be read to preclude the
utilization of any facts relating to intent in determining whether a
decedent died with incidents of ownership, it would seem that
where such facts have a bearing on ownership rights under State
law, they should not be ignored. Recall that, in Crane, the court
gave considerable weight to the decedent's intent, believing itself
compelled to do so under the local community property law.
The Prichard court was not reluctant to look at facts relating to
intent, and, on its face, therefore, Prichard seems to contradict
RIHT directly. The Court in Prichard acknowledges that, under
the State community property law, D had conveyed all of his inci-
128. In view of the applicable provisions of the State community property law, the
IRS took the position that only one half of the policy proceeds were includable in D's gross




dents of ownership to S. But the court pointed, in part, to the in-
tent of D and S that the policy be used to advance D's business
dealings and concluded that, in substance, D possessed an incident
of ownership in the policy because he received an economic benefit
from it. Perhaps the court believed there was a binding contract
between D and S under State law, but the court does not say so
expressly.
Perhaps the court of appeals in Prichard was adopting a rule
that, if it is intended that a decedent is to have an economic bene-
fit from a life insurance policy and the decedent is receiving that
benefit at death, then the proceeds are includable in the decedent's
gross estate, notwithstanding the fact that the terms of the policy
do not expressly grant ownership incidents to the decedent. 12 9 The
court does not say it is adopting such a principle and, given the
court's discussion of "substance over form" and its comment that
the policy was an indispensable part of an integrated transaction,
the suggested principle would seem too simplistic. 130
Clearly the most satisfactory approach would be to determine
whether the decedent's informal understanding or arrangement
produced rights which were enforceable under local law. 3' This
test would have the virtues of (1) being compatible with the rule
discussed in connection with the previous examples (3.1 and 3.2),
and (2) not running afoul of the RIHT proscription against looking
to the parties' intent. Obviously, to the extent that intent is a fac-
tor in the determination of binding and enforceable rights, it will
be impossible to avoid some conflict with RIHT under a strict
reading of that case."32 However, the RIHT principle should not be
offended where a variety of factors, and not just intent, are neces-
sary to establish rights under local law.
13
3
129. Query whether the there possession of an economic benefit in a life insurance
policy is an incident of ownership? See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
130. The ramifications of Prichard are considered in W. Thies, CA-5, in Prichard, In-
cludes in Estate Policy Subject to Parole Agreement, 29 J. OF TAX'N 86 (1968).
131. See the General Comments for Examples 3.1 and 3.2.
132. The suggested solution conflicts with the RIHT opinion in one other respect. In
discussing the question of whether D's father might have had an action against D, the court
of appeals stated (355 F.2d at 11): "The existence of such powers in the decedent is to be
distinguished from such rights as may have existed in decedent's father or duties owed the
father by decedent. It is, therefore, no answer that decedent's father might have proceed
against him in law or in equity." As can be seen from the discussion of the various examples
in the text, most post-RIHT cases which have confronted this issue directly have not fol-
lowed RIHT as to this point.
133. See Morton v. United States, 457 F.2d at 754-55, considered in connection with
Example 1.1,. Cf. Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, considered in connection with Example
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With regard to the instant examples (4.1 and 4.2), if we assume
that the above rule is followed and that the outside factors show
that the informal arrangement and understanding produced en-
forceable rights under State Jaw, then the outside factors will pre-
vail over the policy factors. The result is that D would not have an
incident of ownership in the term deletion case (Example 4.1) and
would have an incident of ownership in the term addition case
(Example 4.2).
F. The Effect of Insurance Company Errors
1. Examples
EXAMPLE 5.1: TERM DELETION CASE
Policy Factors: The policy terms state that, at death, D had the right to
change the beneficiaries on the policy.
Outside Factors: D (or the applicant, if other than D) intended that D was
not to have this right and so advised the insurance company.
EXAMPLE 5.2: TERM ADDITION CASE
Policy Factors: The policy terms do not give D the right to change the ben-
eficiaries on the policy.
Outside Factors: D (or the applicant, if other than D) intended that D was
to have this right and so advised the insurance company.
The examples present the question of whether the intent of the
applicant, expressed to an agent of the company issuing the policy
on D's life, can be more important than the terms of the policy.
This question can be broken down into two parts: If the policy
terms grant the decedent an incident of ownership but the exis-
tence of that incident is contrary to the applicant's intent, does
Section 2042(2) apply? If the policy terms do not grant the dece-
dent an incident of ownership but the absence of that incident is
contrary to the applicant's intent, does Section 2042(2) apply?
2. Term Deletion Cases
The leading example of this exception to the RIHT general prin-
ciple is a term deletion case, Estate of Fuchs v. Commissioner.""
In that case, D and his partner understood, as part of their buy-
sell agreement, that all insurance policies purchased by them on
each other's lives would be owned by the respective beneficiaries.
They gave specific instructions to their insurance agent in this re-
gard, but the policies issued by the insurance company showed
3.2, Par. 81,200 T.C.M. (P-H) at 644.
134. 47 T.C. 199 (1966).
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that each partner had incidents of ownership in the policy insuring
his own life. The partners were unaware of this discrepancy be-
tween the policy terms and their intentions.
The Tax Court concluded that, given the insurance company's
error, D held no incidents of ownership in the policy, and, as a
result, the proceeds of that policy were not includable in his gross
estate. The court followed a specific RIHT exception pertaining to
such errors, one which is expressly set out in the RIHT opinion,
itself.135 As further support for its conclusion, the court made the
following observations regarding the applicable local law: (1) The
partners' agreement with respect to the ownership of the insurance
policies "created an informal relationship of a quasi-trust nature
which obligated the partners to deal with each policy in a manner
conforming to the terms of the agreement. 136 (2) Had the partners
been aware of the error, the policies could have been corrected by
reformation to reflect their intentions and their agreement. 3 7 (3) If
D had acted to violate the terms of this agreement, his partner
would have had a valid claim against decident's estate which would
have reduced the gross estate by an equivalent amount.
1 8
In another term deletion case, Watson v. Commissioner, 39 the
facts were quite similar. The Tax Court relied on RIHT and on
Fuchs in reaching the conclusion that "at his death, the decedent
did not have the legal power to exercise any incidents of ownership
within the meaning of section 2042."1 0 The court also stated that
it was "important that the instructions to [the insurance agent]
were never countermanded and that at no time, during the exis-
tence of either policy, did [D's partner] or the decedent attempt to
exercise any ownership rights, e.g., by borrowing or changing the
beneficiary."""
135. See RIHT, 355 F.2d at 13. See the quotation, below, in the General Comments for
Examples 5.1 and 5.2.
136. Fuchs, 47 T.C. at 204.
137. Fuchs, 47 T.C. at 206. The Tax Court stated that "[tlhe partners' agreement pro-
hibited decedent fom using or disposing of the . . . policies as to receive economic benefit
therefrom or to procure any other satisfactions which are of economic worth." [Emphasis
in original]
138. Id.
139. Par. 77,268 T.C.M. (P-H) (1977).
140. Watson, Par. 77,268 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1089. The Tax Court did not expressly at-
tach any significance to the term "the legal power to exercise." At other points in the opin-
ion, the court simply states that the decedent, did not possess incidents of ownership.
141. Id. at 1088. The Tax Court added: "In this respect, there is a crucial distinction
from the situation which existed in United States v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company,
supra, where the decedent was permitted to exercise the right to change the beneficiary
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The Internal Revenue Service relied on RIHT and Fuchs in Let-
ter Ruling 8610068.142 In that ruling, D's corporate employer pur-
chased four insurance policies on D's life. The employer was
named as the beneficiary on each of the policies. Three of the poli-
cies named the employer as the owner, but the fourth policy
named D as the owner. The employer paid premiums on all four of
the policies and treated all four of the policies as assets of the cor-
poration. At no time did D exercise any of the incidents of owner-
ship granted to D by the terms of the fourth policy. The IRS ob-
served that it was the "agreement, belief, and understanding" of
all parties that D's employer, and not D, would own all four poli-
cies on D's life. The IRS concluded that D was erroneously listed
as the owner of the fourth policy and, as a result, the proceeds of
the policy were not includable in D's gross estate under Section
2042(2).
3. Term Addition Cases
No decided cases have been found which deal with this RIHT
exception in the context of Example 5.2. See the General Com-
ments which follow.
4. General Comments
The examples (5.1 and 5.2) envision a situation where the terms
of an insurance policy are in direct contradiction to the intentions
of the decedent (or of the applicant, if other than the decedent),
and that intention had been made known to the insurance com-
pany. Here, the decedent has made a specific request of the insur-
ance company regarding incidents of ownership, and the insurance
company has erred and has issued a policy which does not follow
the decedent's instructions.
If one were to adhere to the RIHT principle in the term deletion
situation, the result would be clear. D has an incident of ownership
under the contract of insurance, and D's contrary intent does not
negate the fact."" The proceeds would be includable in D's gross
accorded him by the terms of the policy." Id. See also Kearns v. United States, 399 F.2d
226, 231 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
142. This private letter ruling, regarded by the IRS as nonprecedential, was issued on
December 11, 1985.
143. See Cockrill v. O'Hara, 302 F. Supp 1365, 1369 (M.D. Tenn. 1969), specifically
the treatment of the two Equitable Life Assurance policies considered therein. The district
court relied on Noel and RIHT in concluding that the "intent facts" were not relevant. It is
not clear from the facts whether the decedent's intent was ever communicated to the insur-
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estate under Section 2042(2).
However, RIHT expressly provides for an exception to its policy
facts rule in this context - one situation in which the "intent
facts" will prevail. The Court of Appeals stated:
To the principle of the heavy predominance of the "policy facts" over the
"intent facts" there must be added the caveat that, where the insurance
contract itself does not reflect the instructions of the parties, as where an
agent, on his own initiative, inserts a reservation of right to change a benefi-
ciary contrary to the intentions which had been expressed to him, no inci-
dents of ownership are thereby created. National incidents of ownership are
thereby created. National Metropolitan Bank of Washington v. United
States (1950), 87 F. Supp. 773, 115 Ct. Cl. 396; Schongalla v. Hickey, 2 Cir.
1945, 149 F.2d 687.144
The foregoing authorities lead to the conclusion that, notwith-
standing the general rule of RIHT, intent facts (outside factors)
will control over the terms of the insurance contract (policy fac-
tors) in the following factual setting: (1) a policy insuring the life
of the decedent contains a provision which grants an incident of
ownership to the decedent; (2) that provision is inconsistent with
the decedent's intent (or that of the applicant, if other than dece-
dent), which intent has been made known to the insurance com-
pany, and (3) the decedent has never exercised the incident of
ownership granted by the policy. In this term deletion situation,
the erroneous provision will not be regarded as part of the policy
terms for the purposes of Section 2042(2).
There may be some justification for adding a fourth element to
the list above - that, given the error by the insurance company,
the policy in fact grants no incidents of ownership to the decedent
under the application of state law. While it is not clear the extent
to which consistency with local law is mandatory in applying the
RIHT exception, such consistency is certainly desirable in all cases
involving RIHT-related questions.'45 The Tax Court recognized
this point in Fuchs and went out of its way to show how the result
ance company. As a consequence, the case cannot be authoritative as to the questions
presented by Examples 5.1 and 5.2.
144. RIHT, 355 F.2d at 13.
145. This is a point that has been made throughout this article. The Estate Tax is
imposed on interests in property which a decedent owns at death. Estate Tax Section 2033;
Section 20.2042-1(c)(5), Estate Tax Regs. Those interests are determined by examining local
law. See, e.g., note 82, supra, and the associated quotation from Watson v. Comm'r. Accord-
ingly, it stands to reason that the Estate Tax should apply to those incidents of ownership
actually possessed by a decedent under the applicable State statutory and case law. How-
ever, see the following footnote.
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reached by the court was consistent with local law. The Tax Court
opinion implies that the result could have been different (notwith-
standing the RIHT exception) if the applicable principles of State
law had indicated that D did have an incident of ownership.146
With regard to Example 5.1, if we assume that the elements
listed above (for the term deletion situation) are present, then the
policy will be treated as though it did not contain the language
creating an incident of ownership in D.
It would be an unusual case which presented this issue in the
term addition setting described in Example 5.2. However, it is pos-
sible for there to be a situation in which (1) a policy issued by a
life insurance company does not reflect D's (or the applicant's )
intent, communicated to the insurance company, that D was to
possess a particular incident of ownership, and (2) a a result of the
insurance company error, the applicable State law would permit
the policies to be corrected by reformation to reflect the agreement
of the parties.147 One might then argue, for the sake of consistency,
that D should be regarded as possessing an incident of ownership
in the policy. Of course, the taxpayer's response to such a conten-
tion by the IRS would be predictable. 4"
III. APPLYING SECTION 2042(2) TODAY AND TOMORROW
A. The Current State of the Law
The $500,000 proceeds from the policy insuring Mr. Smith's life
will be included if his gross estate under Section 2042(2) if Mr.
Smith held at death any incident of ownership in the policy. In
filling out the Estate Tax return, his executrix, Mrs. Smith, must
ascertain if the decedent in fact possessed such an incident. This
article has dealt with the manner in which the courts have deter-
mined whether a particular power, known to be an incident of
ownership, was possessed by a decedent at death. Based on the
146. Not all courts (not even the Tax Court) are always disturbed by the conceptual
incongruities that are created when strict application of the RIHT case produces a tax result
which is not reflective of the realities under state law. See, e.g., the discussion of the Carl-
strom case, supra note 53. It should be noted that, with the addition of the fourth element,
the factual setting of this issue is similar to that presented in connection with Examples 1.1
and 1.2.
147. Cf. Estate of Fuchs, 47 T.C. at 206.
148. The taxpayer would argue that, if the policy were not in fact reformed at D's
death, D at no time actually had any ability to affect the policy. See, e.g., the discussion in
the Bartlett case, 54 T.C. at 1598, concerning the ability vs. the right to exercise an incident
of ownership. The IRS would then counter with the observation that the insurance policy in
Fuchs was never reformed.
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foregoing discussion, the most satisfactory approach for dealing
with this question under the current state of the law is as follows.
The executrix must first look to the language of all of the writ-
ings constituting the contract of insurance (the policy factors).
Regardless of whether the policy factors grant the decedent a
power or not, her inquiry does not stop there. The executrix must
also examine the State statutory and decisional law to see if the
power is dealt with by the provisions of local law. Those provisions
can clearly override the policy factors, and nothing in RIHT sug-
gests a contrary rule.
In this regard, the executrix should also seek to determine if a
local court ruling or order affects the power in any manner. Bind-
ing decisions of local courts, which properly apply the law of the
State, can also take precedence over the policy factors and,
thereby, affect the existence of a power in the decedent.
The executrix should then inquire into the possibility of a formal
"side" agreement between the decedent and a third party. This,
too, can establish rights under local law, and ignoring it because it
is extrinsic to the insurance contract can lead to incongruous re-
sults. This would particularly be the case when the side agreement
(providing, e.g., that the decedent has assigned away an incident)
is at odds with the language of the policy (providing, e.g. that the
decedent possesses that incident). The better view is that the
RIHT principle should not be applied to preclude an inquiry into
the terms of a binding agreement entered into by the decedent and
that such a contract can be determinative on the issue of whether
the decedent possessed an incident of ownership.
Absent a formal "side" agreement, the executrix should look into
the existence of an informal arrangement or understanding be-
tween the decedent and a third party. If the informal arrangement
amounts to a contract, it can be significant for the reasons given
above. On the other hand, if the outside factors show nothing more
than the decedent's subjective intent, then they would appear to
fall squarely within the RIHT prohibition and would be irrelevant
to the Section 2042(2) inquiry. Intent, however, can be relevant
when it bears on property rights under local law. The best advice
for the executrix would be for her to determine whether the dece-
dent's informal arrangement produced rights which were enforcea-
ble under local law. If that is the case, the outside factors can
predominate over the policy factors.
The executrix should also examine the decedent's intent in one
other respect, and here the RIHT case is instructive. The executrix
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should ascertain whether there is a provision in the insurance con-
tract, ostensibly granting the decedent an incident of ownership,
which the decedent (or of the policy applicant, if other than the
decedent) specifically never intended to be in the contract. If there
is such a provision, the executrix should ascertain whether the con-
trary intent had been communicated to the insurance company (or
to its agent). If so, and if the power had never been exercised by
the decedent, the erroneous provision will be ignored for Section
2042(2) purposes. It would also appear arguable that a comparable
approach might be availed of for the purpose of adding a provision
to the policy terms. The most reasonable view would seem to be
that, if it is claimed that an insurance company made an error in
the policy terms, the decedent's intent should be accorded sub-
stance for tax purposes when the circumstances would warrant ref-
ormation of the insurance contract under local law. In that event,
under this RIHT exception, the outside factors should prevail.
In following this approach, the executrix must bear in mind that
there is not complete agreement among the decided cases as to the
one acceptable method of resolving this issue.
B. A Proposal for the Future
The mere reading of RIHT, the post-RIHT cases, and the perti-
nent regulations does not provide adequate guidance on the han-
dling of Section 2042(2) cases involving the issue of whether "the
decedent possessed at death" an incident of ownership. The ap-
proach discussed in the preceding section of this article is the
product of analysis of various authorities and cannot be gleaned
from any one source. As a consequence, it is the author's recom-
mendation that the Internal Revenue Service address this issue in
more explicit regulations, following the method outlined above, in
order to assist the taxpaying public in comprehending the statu-
tory requirements.
The regulatory language to be adopted by the IRS could be
along the following lines. The author's suggested addition to the
regulations under Section 2042(2), set out below, is divided into
two parts: Part A deals with the term deletion case, and Part B
deals with the term addition case.
[PART A]
SECTION Al: General Rule. The proceeds of an insurance policy
which insures the life of a decedent shall be includable in the dece-
dent's gross estate when -
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(a) the policy factors disclose that the decedent possessed at
death a power to affect the policy; and
(b) the decedent's power is an "incident of ownership," as that
term is used in Section 2042(2).
SECTION A2: Policy Factors. The term "policy factors" means the
terms of the contract of insurance, as they appear in the applica-
tion for insurance and in the policy document, including endorse-
ments thereto, as well as in any written amendments and assign-
ments of the policy which are filed with and accepted by the
insurance company.
SECTION A3: Exceptions. Notwithstanding the policy factors,
Section Al shall not apply to any power which the decedent does
not possess -
(a) pursuant to the provisions of local law as they apply -
(1) to the decedent,
(2) to life insurance policies in general, or
(3) to the life insurance policy at issue;
(b) pursuant to a binding order or ruling of a court having jurisdic-
tion over the decedent or the policy;
(c) pursuant to an enforceable agreement (written or oral) to which
the decedent is a party.
SECTION A4: Intent of Decedent. In determining whether any ex-
ception set out in Section A3 applies in a particular case, the in-
tent of the decedent shall be taken into account to the extent that
it is relevant under the applicable provisions of local law.
SECTION A5: Erroneously granted power.
(a) Section A3(a)(3) shall be construed to exclude from the appli-
cation of Section Al: an erroneously granted power.
(b) The term "erroneously granted power" means a power de-
scribed in Section Al which -
(1) the decedent has never exercised;
(2) was included in the policy provisions despite the fact that the
insurance company (or its agent) had been apprised that the power
was one which the applicant for the policy never intended the de-
cedent to possess; and
(3) would be excluded from the policy factors in a local court pro-
ceeding to reform the contract of insurance.
[PART B]
SECTION Bi: General Rule. The proceeds of an insurance policy
which insures the life of a decedent shall be includable in the dece-
dent's gross estate when the decedent possesses at death an
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outside power, notwithstanding the fact that the policy factors do
not grant the decedent an "incident of ownership," as that term is
used in Section 2042(2).
SECTION B2: Policy Factors. The term "policy factors" means the
terms of the contract of insurance, as they appear in the applica-
tion for insurance and in the policy document, including endorse-
ments thereto, as well as in any written amendments and assign-
ments of the policy which are filed with and accepted by the
insurance company.
SECTION B3: Outside Power. The term "outside power" means a
power to affect the policy which -
(a) is an "incident of ownership" as that term is used in Section
2042; and
(b) the decedent possesses -
(1) pursuant to the provisions of local law as they apply -
(i) to the decedent,
(ii) to life insurance policies in general, or
(iii) to the life insurance policy at issue;
(2) pursuant to a binding order or ruling of a court having jurisdic-
tion over the decedent or the policy; or
(3) pursuant to an enforceable agreement (written or oral) to which
the decedent is a party.
SECTION B4: Intent of Decedent. In determining whether Section
B3(b) applies in a particular case, the intent of the decedent shall
be taken into account to the extent that it is relevant under the
applicable provisions of local law.
SECTION B5: Erroneously Omitted Power.
(a) Section B3(b)(3) shall be construed to include within the defi-
nition of outside power: an erroneously omitted power.
(b) The term "erroneously omitted power" means a power which-
(1) if possessed by a decedent, would be an "incident of owner-
ship," as that term is used in Section 2042(2);
(2) was omitted from the policy provisions despite the fact that the
insurance company (or its agent) had been apprised that the power
was one which the applicant for the policy intended the decedent
to possess; and
(3) would be included in the policy factors in a local court proceed-
ing to reform the contract of insurance.
C. Conclusion
The regulatory provisions recommended above are regarded by
the author as setting out the most satisfactory method of resolving
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the possession of incidents issue because they adopt those features
of RIHT and the post-RIHT cases that are most closely attuned to
the purposes of Section 2042(2) and because they avoid a tax result
which is incompatible with the decedent's actual property rights
under the applicable State law. It is believed that regulations of
this nature are necessary under Section 2042(2) in order to avoid
the problems and incongruities seen to date in some of the post-
RIHT cases and to assist the courts in the development of a ra-
tional and consistent body of law.
